Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Perry Anderson. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Perry Anderson. Mostrar todas las entradas

Perry Anderson:COUNTERPUNCHER

 New Left Review No.85


With the posthumous publication of A Colossal Wreck, the triptych for which Alexander Cockburn will be remembered is complete. Corruptions of Empire offered a scintillating frieze of American politics and culture from the mid-seventies to the late eighties. The Golden Age Is In Us, more reflective and personal in form, is an intricately constructed album and journal that continues to the mid-nineties. A Colossal Wreck, a narrative mosaic, ends in the second decade of this century. Moving depictions of Alexander were written by Robin Blackburn and JoAnn Wypijewski when he died. [1] A Colossal Wreck opens and closes with two others from his family, his brother Andrew and his daughter Daisy. Better portraits will not be written. No attempt will be made here to write about him in comparable fashion. But each of his friends will have their own memories of Alexander. In my case, biographical chance brought us together along the curve of his life, from Ireland to England, from New York to California. Maybe that allows some contribution to framing it. 

No other person I have ever known was so deeply and productively marked by family background. The relationship of sons to fathers is rarely without conflict; and where there is none, the effect is more typically disabling than empowering, or neutral. For a father to be object at once of adoration, emulation and emancipation would seem a contradiction in terms. Yet so it was in the case of Alexander. Throughout his life Claud was a model for him—he once said he thought of him every day—and his career would follow an arc often uncannily like that of Claud’s. Yet far from being a psychological shackle, reducing him to imitation, it was as if the intensity of the bond was the condition of an individuality out of the ordinary. The paradox, of course, says much about the parent who made it possible. 

Claud Cockburn recounted his own life—up to the age of fifty-seven—in an artful and entertaining trilogy that records a remarkable career. [2]  Born in Peking in 1904, where his father was secretary to the British Legation during the Boxer Uprising, as a youth he spent much of his time, during breaks from education in England, in Budapest, while his father sorted out Allied war claims on Hungary. After Oxford, Claud first worked free-lance for the Times in Berlin, before becoming a correspondent for the paper in New York. Arriving in the us on the eve of the crash of 1929, he resigned his post in early 1932, returning first to Central Europe again, and then to England. There he created The Week, a confidential newsletter, exposing intrigues and scandals in high places, read and feared not only in the clubs and country houses of the British oligarchy, but their counterparts across the Continent. In 1934 he started writing for the Daily Worker, while contributing concurrently to Time and Fortune. After 1936 he reported on Spain for the Worker, and England for Pravda. During the War, he was diplomatic correspondent for the Worker, but in 1947 quit for a life in Ireland with his wife Patricia. There he wrote his three volumes of memoirs; five novels, one of which was made into a film by John Huston; contributed to Punch; and became an inspiration and collaborator of Private Eye. [3]  He died in 1981. 

For the richness of this trajectory and the personality behind it, there is no substitute for Claud’s own reminiscences. But retrospectively, certain strands of particular moment for Alexander can be indicated. Claud was the most brilliant journalist of his generation to hold a uk passport. But his career was at a sharp angle to British society, with which his connexions were never that close. Central Europe, America and Ireland were more congenial to him than Ukania. The Week, one of the great original inventions of twentieth-century journalism, was foreign in conception: borrowing technically from the mimeographed attacks of Oswald Schuette, a friend in Washington, against the big radio companies in the us, and cyclostyled bulletins of Kurt von Schleicher, the last Chancellor of Weimar Germany; and journalistically from Le Canard enchaîné in Paris. So, too was the pool of London-based reporters—American, German, Polish, French—on whose tips it drew. An international correspondent, Claud disclaimed any feel for domestic affairs. England was a country too small for its boots, as he once put it. [4] 

Together with this sense of distance from national life went his independence of spirit. As a young man with no fixed employment, he three times turned down offers of a job at the Times, then at the pinnacle of its global prestige, before eventually accepting one on his own terms, specifying New York as the only post he would consider. Within a couple of years he astonished his employers by quitting his privileged perch in Manhattan for an impoverished cubby-hole of his own devising at The Week. Enjoying the pleasures of the world as much as anyone, he was never an economic captive of them, living most of his life in debt and much of it in straitened circumstances. Exposed to the Hungarian inflation after the First World War, money was a notional quantity for him. [5]  But while that was a condition of his decision to jettison the Times in 1932, its motivation was political. In Austria, five years earlier, a love affair had led him to the polemics of Lenin and Zinoviev against the First World War, for him a political coup de foudre in the wake of the emotional one. [6]  From that time on, whatever his organizational links or otherwise, about which he was characteristically discreet, he was by conviction a revolutionary. 

But he became a Communist after his own fashion, outside the precincts of the national party, and little in keeping with its ways. For their part, its leaders distrusted The Week, over which they had no control. In the thirties he was personally much closer to international operatives of the Comintern—Otto Katz, Egon Erwin Kisch, Willi Münzenberg, Mikhail Koltsov—than to local stalwarts. When the British party and its newspaper rallied to the war effort after 1941, the slogans of patriotic unity under which they did so had little appeal for Claud. Formed in the twenties before the arrival of the Popular Front, his political temperament was more radically oppositional, leaving him uncomfortable with the brief transformation of the cpgb from ‘hated sect to high-powered bandwagon’, not to speak of its delusions about Labour in 1945. [7]  Two years later, seeing the futility of his work for the party, he had had enough: a timely ulcer allowed him to retire with his family to Youghal without any public break with it. When the Hungarian Revolt came in 1956, the fact of the rising itself—before even its repression—was sufficient condemnation of what had become of Communism in Eastern Europe. But to the end, he remained loyal to the revolutionary tradition to which he had committed himself, in the same free-form style. Typically, the high-point of his war-time journalism had been a colloquy with De Gaulle in Algiers, for whom, sensing the independence of spirit that would make him so disliked by Washington and London, he acquired an immediate admiration. 
Sixties London 

Attitudes to country, career, money, politics: in one way or another, all these would connect father and son. But to anyone who knew them both, the most obvious link was temperament. Claud’s first wife, the American writer Hope Hale—also a Communist, who left the Party after the Nazi–Soviet Pact—wrote much later of her time with him that what charmed her was his combination of an irrepressible gaiety, mischief and wit with his utterly serious commitment to sweeping away capitalism. [8]  Just that combination found a second embodiment in Alexander. We grew up about forty miles apart in south-east Ireland, the Cockburns living across the county line between Cork and Waterford, where Youghal lay at the edge of an Anglo-Irish society along the Blackwater, more rackety but grander than that by the Suir. There were military and Far Eastern connexions in both families—one of the Cockburn forebears sacked Washington, another governed Hong Kong—and comparable experiences of childhood in Ireland and boarding school in Britain. After finishing at Oxford, Alexander’s first publication was a review of Catch-22 in nlr, [9]  and for a time we shared a flat in Lexham Gardens, off Earl’s Court. Even in the general exuberance of youth in that period—the London of Blow-Up in the mid-sixties—his dash and high spirits stood out. 

His first job was with the Times Literary Supplement. He was impecunious, and pay was modest, if topped up with sale of review copies of books with which the shelves of the flat were soon groaning. But intellectually, it was a glamorous post. In those days, under the editorship of Arthur Crook, the tls had a cutting, continental edge—presiding influences were John Willett, the foremost Brechtian scholar of the time, and John Sturrock, covering French structuralism—that it would lose under the Cold War incumbency which followed. Here, anonymously like every other contributor, Alexander copy-edited and wrote about novels. [10]  His longest piece was a lead essay, ‘Sounding the Sixties’, behind a cover by Hockney, surveying the politics, education, literature, theatre, cinema, press, criticism and historiography of the decade at mid-point. [11]  Not long afterwards, in the spring of 1966, he gave up a post everyone else regarded as highly desirable, without having found, or even sought, a new one. I was astonished, and deeply impressed, by his freedom of spirit. Pending anything else, he took over the running of nlr, boxing our ears stylistically to rid the journal of its tics and clichés. Unlike his father, Alexander started out as a literary journalist: it was his time at nlr, at the height of the revolutionary ferment of the later sixties, that made him a political writer. In his obituary, Robin Blackburn has recalled their joint work in producing two books for the journal, one on the national rise of trade-union militancy, the other on the international student revolt of the time—the latter, a best-seller, fronted by a trenchant overview from Alexander, one of the first pieces in England to speak also of the society of the spectacle, that continues to read well today. [12] 

In due course, he was picked up by the New Statesman, then edited by Paul Johnson, later a hysterical neo-conservative caustically remembered by Alexander as ‘the only man I know with clenched hair’. [13]  But he did not write a great deal for it, with the exception of a long reportage of early 1969 on Ulster, in which readers could get a glimpse of his political teeth. [14]  But through it he met and befriended its us correspondent, Andy Kopkind, and contributed to the modest sheet that Kopkind and Jim Ridgeway were producing in Washington, first title Mayday, then Hard Times. [15]  Restless, he also joined forces with Bruce Page and Neal Ascherson to create a Free Communications Group that produced a few issues of a slender vertical tract, Open Secret, attacking the condition of the media. In the autumn of the following year, a more youthful group—Anthony Barnett was a prime mover—started planning a weekly that would transform this scene, with a style of revolutionary journalism that would not be narrow, formulaic or catechistic, but aimed at a mass readership of the young, educated and critical, who were demonstrating in tens of thousands against the war in Vietnam. All decisions would be taken collectively, with no staff hierarchy. But when the first number appeared in October 1971, Alexander was effectively its editor. Title, conception and presentation were his. 

In the third volume of his memoirs Claud had described his extended involvement in the late fifties in a project for a new weekly with the Hulton Press, publishers of Picture Post, to be called Seven Days, in which he had high hopes but which was scuppered by the proprietors. This was the name Alexander chose for the paper he would now produce. In hindsight, beside the paternal precedent, another strain in his inheritance is visible. Unlike Claud, Patricia had a highly developed visual sense, becoming late in life a successful shell-painter in Ireland. In Alexander, who bought paintings even in his tls days, this extended into a love of photography that he brought to the weekly in prospect. The dummy on which funding for it was raised declared: ‘In the whole history of left, radical or even liberal journalism, only Picture Post, in this country, used the opportunities offered by really good photographs, to back up stories, or tell stories on their own.’ Seven Days would make good this gap, dramatizing its stories and articles with pictures exploding the banalizations of the image-drenched consumer world. Handling covers, lay-out, typography and contents, Alexander gave to a common project a round-the-clock energy and panache all his own. Appearing at the height of the conflict in Northern Ireland, during the first—victorious—miners’ strike in Britain, and the final stages of the war in Vietnam, Seven Days sought to combine social reportage, political investigation, discussion of ideas, coverage (more intermittent) of films or books, in a style at once uncompromisingly militant and intellectually accessible. Editorially, it fell little short of the aims it set out to achieve. [16]  But commercially, it was of no avail. The paper lasted for six months before money ran out and the receivers moved in. 

To this dispiriting blow in the spring of 1972 were added a marriage gone awry and debts to rival Claud’s, not a few incurred—like his father’s—on synopses for works that for one reason or another didn’t materialize. In later years, Alexander’s buoyancy often seemed indestructible. But in that season he was in low water. In A Colossal Wreck, he makes of his pass an entertaining legend: 

One day in the late summer of 1972 I had occasion to be in the portion of south London known as Balham. It was hot, and the streets infinitely dreary. I must get away, I muttered to myself, like Razumov talking to Councillor Mikulin in Conrad’s Under Western Eyes. 

I turned in the direction of the subway station. A dingy sign caught my eye, in a sub-basement window. I knocked, and the sybil, in Indian saree, greeted me. She had Tarot cards and a parrot, a method of divination with an ancient lineage in India. She dealt the cards. The parrot looked at them, then at me, then at the fortune teller. Some current of energy passed between them. 

A forecast of what would become New Labour was enough: ‘Within a week, obeying the promptings of the parrot, I had booked a flight to New York and a new life. Ahead of me lay a vast political landscape, seemingly of infinite richness and possibility. Never for a moment have I regretted my journey westward.’ [17] 
Stateside 

He arrived in America on the eve of Nixon’s re-election. There, on the strength of an article about chess, he persuaded the publisher of the Village Voice to let him run a projected books division while contributing to the paper. [18]  His next two pieces, appearing in December 1972, were about photography: a critical review of a show by Diane Arbus, and an obituary of Life, which had just expired. ‘Press Clips’, the column on the media that would make him famous in the States, started to appear in September 1973, as Allende was overthrown and Watergate moved towards its climax. By the following year, he was co-writing with Jim Ridgeway another column in the Voice on the economy, ‘Surplus Value’, later expanding across the political scene as ‘The Greasy Pole’ and finally ‘The Moving Target’. Soon he was appearing in the New York Review of Books, More, and a raft of other publications. Coming to Manhattan for the first time in the summer of 1976, and staying in the capacious apartment that by then he occupied in Central Park West, bohemian Art Deco in feel, was a revelation for me: streaking like a literary—and social—meteor across the cityscape, he had entered into the plenitude of his gifts. As soon as I read copies of the Voice that were littered around the sitting-room overlooking the park—I was scarcely aware of its existence till then—I realized that he had developed a style of attack journalism of pure exhilaration. Its mixture of elegance and insolence, at once savage and hilarious, was unlike anything I had ever seen before. In the self-important press of mainstream America, one bloviating conformist after another was being taken apart. On arriving at his ‘How to be a Foreign Correspondent’, on C. L. Sulzberger, [19]  I suggested he photocopy everything he had produced since getting to the States, and assemble the columns he was carelessly dumping or scattering about him for a future collection. Much later, he would draw on them for Corruptions of Empire. 

Over time, an American legend grew up that Alexander had hit local journalism like a bolt of lightning by introducing an English fashion of polemical writing, unknown in the us, but familiar in Britain. I lost count of the number of Stateside obituaries that repeated this notion. Nothing could be further from the truth. In point of style, Alexander himself did not write like this in London: his pieces in the tls were often quite stilted, in keeping with the conventions of the paper and the period. Of his father Alexander observed: ‘He wrote fast, with a beautifully easy style’, but Claud was himself the first to say this was not always so, remarking that in his mid-twenties, ‘I wrote slowly and my style was erratic.’ [20]  The incomparable zing of ‘Press Clips’ was not imported from the uk; it was invented in the us. Still less had its object anything to do with British example. In Ukania, criticism of the press in the press has long been taboo, governed by the Fleet Street maxim that dog does not eat dog—a rule breached only where crime rather than ideology or politics is at issue. [21]  Murdoch can offer a good conscience to all, but even in the most independent of venues—say, the London Review of Books—treating belles âmes of the Guardian or Independent along Cockburn lines would be unthinkable. 

In New York, the Voice of the time was generally regarded as the most radical weekly in the country. But Alexander’s columns were well to the left of its centre of gravity, and in due course the distance between them led to his departure over the most predictable of local flash-points, Israel. In early 1984, the editor of the Voice—a former stalwart of the New York Times—suspended him for having two years earlier received a grant to write a book on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon from an Institute of Arab Studies, by then extinct for want of funds. Overwhelmingly, readers of the paper expressed incredulity and anger at the decision. But the upshot was never in doubt: Zionism was not to be trifled with. Prompted by Andy Kopkind and seeing an opportunity, Victor Navasky hired Alexander for the Nation on the spot. [22]  The move was a boon to both paper and author. The column that Alexander negotiated with Navasky, named ‘Beat the Devil’ after Claud’s most successful novel, gave him two facing pages each fortnight, a space in which he could vary his palette and amplify his register beyond the staccato of ‘Press Clips’. For his discovery of America had been not only of a political landscape vaster and more energizing than Britain, but of a literary landscape wilder and more liberating. Of himself he said, much later, that the prose stylists who had attracted ‘an Anglo-Irish lad hopelessly strapped into the corsets of Latinate gentility’ were always ‘American rough-housers’; and once across the Atlantic, though he never tried to imitate them, ‘they all taught me that at its most rapturous, its most outraged, its most exultant, American prose can let go and teach you to let go’, [23]  releasing him for writing of the kind he perfected in these years. 

He was much in demand. By the turn of the eighties, he had a political column in the Wall Street Journal, covered restaurants for House and Garden, could be read in Harper’s and the Atlantic Monthly, Vanity Fair and American Film Institute, and—at his most accomplished—in Grand Street. But his main impact was on the Nation itself, whose circulation doubled from a lowly 24,000 the year after he moved to it, and nearly doubled again the following year. Navasky attributed the increase to his direct-mail campaigns, but few doubted a Cockburn effect. ‘Beat the Devil’ changed the face of the Nation, not least in the brim-full Letters Pages it elicited, where Alexander delighted in riposting con brio: no one in the history of the Nation ever received or replied to so many challenges from readers. He had found his best audience. 

Yet at the height of his success as the funniest and fiercest columnist in New York, a stylish man about town as well as of letters, what had lured him to the States, and made him the writer he became, was slipping away. He had arrived amid the high drama of Nixon’s fall from power, and thrived during the lachrymose Carter years, as the Democrats ushered in the reign of neo-liberalism and its footstool in human rights. A mocking fable about the President of malaise and a pioneering exploration of political ecology, both co-authored with Ridgeway, were the fruit of this turn. [24]  But in a clairvoyant piece as early as 1976, Alexander saw that the future lay with Reagan, who was setting the political agenda to come. Once in power, Alexander gave him no mercy, in one blistering entry after another in a sequence that would make up ‘Annals of the Age of Reagan’ in Corruptions of Empire, as his Presidency came to a close. Nor did he spare the nominal opposition to it. Shortly after joining the Nation, Alexander could still co-sign with Andy Kopkind an oblique suggestion that a vote for Mondale was necessary in 1984, soon retracted, and four years later retain some hope in the Rainbow Coalition behind Jackson, fading almost as quickly. [25]  By the end of the decade he had concluded of America’s two parties, along with popular wisdom, that if you insist on choosing the lesser of two evils, you are liable to end up with both. 

In the eighties, too, the shift to the right was not just political, but social and cultural; the self-professedly liberal mainstream abetting the conservative turn across the board, and once radical outliers reduced to feeble squeaks. It was the time of The New Criterion, ‘the only magazine of its kind that arrives at the bookstore covered in cobwebs’, when Rolling Stone had become a fanzine, and The Voice was ‘so spavined with Democratic reform politics that it needs crutches to get out of the paddock’. [26]  As the country was going, so went the city. In the seventies, much of New York was unsafe, most of the town was hideous, Manhattan was leaking industry, and the municipality teetered on the edge of bankruptcy. But culturally and politically, the city continued to pulse with a ramshackle vitality. In the following decade, with the lift-off of the Reagan boom, stock and real-estate prices soared, and the era of Trump and Boesky set in—developers ‘swarming all over New York like cockroaches, seeking out, with intent to destroy, any structure with the least pretensions to dignity and grace’, [27]  and a social polarization that has since turned Manhattan into a reservation of the rich. Alexander had always enjoyed buccaneering raids into the beau monde. But like his father, he never fell captive to it. Increasingly coarsened into a cityscape of bloated plutocrats, servile intellectuals and shivering homeless, the metropolis lost its allure. For all his debonair swathe through so many of its milieux, his only close friends in New York were in one way or another marginal to it: Edward Said, Palestinian in a fastness of Zionism; Andy Kopkind, gay out of New England; Ben Sonnenberg, cripple amid a forest of gyms. By mid-decade, Alexander was spending increasing time elsewhere, Vermont or Key West. Eventually, turbulence in his personal life brought Central Park West to an end. By the time Corruptions of Empire came out in 1987, he was on the road across the country. 
To the Lost Coast 

The book, a hugely popular success, brought him into direct contact with his readers, as he travelled through the nation, talking about it in small towns, campuses and independent bookstores, lugging battered suitcases awash with his papers along with him, often in one of the classic cars of the fifties and sixties he was soon collecting. The solidarity movements with Central America, Palestine, South Africa, in which he was deeply involved, provided the rolodex for these meetings across the country. By the time the second, enlarged edition of Corruptions appeared in 1988, he was resident in a cheap motel in Aptos (population 6,000), just south of Santa Cruz, drawn there by friendship with Frank Bardacke, political activist and historian of the United Farm Workers, who lived in nearby Watsonville; also close enough to keep a fond eye on his daughter Daisy, installed at ucsc. Soon he was often down in Topanga, not far from ucla, working with Susanna Hecht on the book they brought out in 1990 on the Amazon, The Fate of the Forest, a landmark in the literature. In December, he noted laconically: 

It will be goodbye next year to Aptos and the Adobe. It looks as though I will be able to buy the house in Petrolia on the Mattole River, in Humboldt County, just south of Cape Mendocino. It must be the genes. My father quit the city life for rural life in Ireland when he was in his early forties. I’m forty-nine, but I haven’t really lived in a big city since the middle eighties. Motel life is okay, but the drug trade here at the Adobe is getting dangerous. [28] 

By the following summer, he was writing from Petrolia, a hamlet of 350 souls on the Lost Coast, five to six hours drive north of San Francisco. 

There he rebuilt the shack he had bought into a low-slung ranch house, its back to a steep wooded hill, with the river running under a majestic limestone bluff a hundred yards in front of it, just beyond the modest road threading along the valley. In this lovely, unassuming setting he added a library, a dark-room, stables, a garden, an orchard, a cider-house and a turret on the hill above. Decorated with murals, sculptures, banner, bower, friezes in appliqué plaster of rural life or guerrilla struggle, these outworks came to surround the house itself, of which he made a nonchalant Wunderkammer of objects, drawings, photographs, paintings, bibelots out of every epoch of colloquial American taste from the twenties to the seventies, picked up in auctions or junk-shops across the country. In moving to this retreat, he invoked the example of his father, but if genes were at work in its creation, they came from the artistic gifts and rustic sensibility of his mother. A craftsman with words, Alexander was—quite unlike Claud—a craftsman with things, too, designing anything from a wooden sink or wash-basin to a retractable bed or a muslin bunk-veil, and collaborating with local artisans in the growth of the strange Gesamtkunstwerk that over time his home in Petrolia became, complete with horses, cats, parakeets, dog and cockatoo. 

All of this cost money. In his dealings with it, Alexander differed little from Claud, as he was aware: ‘My father’s Micawberish struggle, pursued with heroic tenacity to virtually the very moment he died . . . to keep clear of financial disaster greatly conditioned my attitude to credit.’ [29]  His love of all that is tangible being much greater, however, his tastes—automobile, sartorial, architectural—though never grand, were more expensive, and the debts he ran up larger, from an income that was mostly higher, but not necessarily steadier or more secure: a columnist can be terminated from one day to the next. So he too could be careless, or ruthless, in fiduciary matters: cause of the only tensions—political differences aside—I ever observed in his many friendships, though ruptures were in the end usually healed. It was the other side of his style of independence, in its fashion the opposite of any ordinary self-interest: he could walk away from a debt others would respect as he could from a position others would covet. Something not dissimilar was true of his relations with women. Few men have been more attractive to them. Refusals of him must have been rare. It was sometimes said he had a weakness for the well-off, and it is true that among his partners were a number of surnames known for wealth or birth. But the gamut of his affections knew no class distinction: from London to Petrolia, he could be as readily épris of a working-class girl as of a millionaire’s daughter, and often more lastingly so. With few exceptions, he remained on good terms with former lovers, typically still with fond memories of him. But he never committed himself wholly to any woman. In part, I think, the reason may have lain in the intensity of his love for his father, with which no other human being could compete. But it was a function of his way of being independent too. The life of the senses and their passions was central to him. But he resisted the rhythms of cohabitation, which never suited him. The remoteness of Petrolia was a guard against them: few women would sue to share it. 

Sonnenberg might compare the Lost Coast to Kamchatka, but its remoteness was not isolation: if the Wall Street Journal ceased to publish him in 1990, the nyrb long before, he continued into the mid-nineties to delight and appall readers of the Nation, gained a column in the Los Angeles Times, and appeared in syndicated form in many a smaller outlet across the land, not to speak of the country’s most radical local newspaper, the Anderson Valley Advertiser in adjoining Mendocino county. More significant was a further spiral downwards in the political environment. The eighties had seen a rightward shift in the centre of gravity of the American political system under the Reagan Presidency, but in the margins outside it there had been a vigorous movement of solidarity with the Central American revolutions that Washington was determined to strangle. The nineties opened with the pay-off for bi-partisan support for the Contras. By the time Alexander was on the West Coast, the Sandinistas had been brought down in Nicaragua, and the movement was over. A year later came triumph over the Evil Empire, and the victory of Operation Desert Storm. Worse followed, with the installation of Clinton: a course correction of the ruling order whose demobilization of opposition more than outweighed any of the weak palliatives it offered to the grip of neo-liberalism at home, let alone its escalation of imperial swagger abroad. 

It was in this lowering context that Alexander composed the most achieved of all his works, The Golden Age Is In Us, its very title—and epigraph from Lévi-Strauss—a defiance of the time. Presented as a record of ‘journeys and encounters’ between 1987 and 1994, each entry accorded time and place, it is a beautifully designed retro-construction of his life and his writing in these years, interspersed with letters—indignant, amused or elated—from enemies, friends, readers at large. Assembled and dated into a narrative after the fact, the book switches register effortlessly from the literary to the historical, the existential to the polemical, the anecdotal to the analytical, the satirical to the biographical, under the overarching sign of the political. 

From the start, long before Clinton was elected, Alexander foresaw what the governor of Arkansas, mired in state-level malfeasance and connexions to the Contra programme, would mean as a ruler of the country: Walmart jobs for the many and Marc Rich pardons for the few. Within five months of the new Presidency he was writing: ‘The Clinton administration is over. Oh, it will drag on in a thickening twilight of new beginnings and fresh tomorrows’, under a ruler whose language bespoke his vision: ‘Clinton’s sloppy, tired phrases limp through the reality of America like an obese Sunday jogger waddling down the road.’ [30]  Of his claim to diplomatic fame, Alexander, abandoning mockery, wrote in words that are no less implacably actual today: 

It would take the pen of Swift to evoke the nauseating scenes of hypocrisy, bad faith and self-delusion on the White House lawn today, crammed as it was with people who for long years were complicit in the butchery and torture of Palestinians and the denial of their rights, now applauding the ‘symbolic handshake’ that in fact ratified further negation of those same rights. In the shadow of an American President with the poise and verbiage of the manager of a McDonald’s franchise, Arafat produced oratory so meagre it made Rabin sound like Cicero. 

Right now, Palestinians get the right to manage the world’s largest prison, the Gaza Strip, plus one cow town. It’s as though the Irish in 1921 got Tralee plus a few acres in West Cork, with the British holding the entire eastern half, Belfast, Dublin, Waterford, plus all the resources, with its army free to roam at will across the Irish enclaves, themselves fragmented by British highways and drained of water. There will be no Palestinian sovereignty and an economy completely subordinated to Israel’s. [31] 

Abroad, the travesties of the French Revolution at its bicentennial—‘all those economic royalists mustered behind their bulletproof glass on the Champs Elysées’, gazing at Mitterrand’s march-past of strobe-lit kitsch—were followed by the cremation of the Russian Revolution, in Gorbachev’s ‘cubic metres of hot air’ and the hopeless nostalgia of those who tried to bring him down. [32] The Golden Age Is In Us ends with the death of Andy Kopkind, and the memory of Patricia’s five years earlier. But its effect is the opposite of a threnody: from the first page to the last, it is entertaining, inspiriting, uplifting. The opening entry from Key West sets the tone: 

There was a funeral in the graveyard across the street this morning; an old-fashioned black one, with a drummer out in front of the coffin. Thump thump thump. I find myself sketching out the music for my own funeral: the aria at the start of Così fan tutte, sung by the flirty girls. 

Leftists’ funerals can be a trial: too much sententious linking of the expired human with the forward, though mostly thwarted, march of history. [33] 
Punching back 

By the time The Golden Age appeared in 1995, Alexander had joined Ken Silverstein, who had been one of his interns at the Nation, as co-editor of CounterPunch, a fortnightly newsletter Silverstein had created in Washington, roughly on the model of I. F. Stone’s Weekly, focussing on the scandals and corruptions of the nation’s capital. A year later, the two collaborated on a book scything through the tundra of political hacks, pundits, lobbyists, fawners, fixers and ranters in and around dc. In its portraits of leading journalists and commentators of the day, Washington Babylon is an afterlife of ‘Press Clips’. [34]  But the inspiration for the project came from much further back, in the work Claud wrote to pay his passage back to Europe, High Low Washington, published under the nom de guerre of ‘30–32’. Witnessing close-up the American political system under the Hoover Administration, Claud harboured few illusions it would be much altered by the advent of Roosevelt, who would probably be carried to power by ‘the resentment, bewilderment, and an imbecile belief in easy solutions to gigantic contradictions’ of voters in a country whose future was that of ‘a great military and naval power irrevocably launched on a career of financial and commercial imperialism’. With adjustments for period style, Claud’s judgement of the role of Democrats and Republicans in the political firmament could have been written by his son. The last sentence of High Low Washington reads: ‘There are times when the American public, in its attitude of mingled cynicism, indulgence and devotion to its two historic parties, recalls to mind that old man of Khartoum, who, it is recorded: 

Kept two black sheep in his room,

They remind me, he said,

Of two friends that are dead,

But I cannot remember of whom. [35] 

In the wake of Washington Babylon, and perhaps not unconnected with it, Alexander’s space in the Nation, which had always formed a sort of liberated territory within its normal regimen, shrank. Under its new editor, Katrina vanden Heuvel, a redesign of the magazine at the end of 1995 had downgraded his two-page facing spread to overleaf status, and in 1997 he was cut to one page. Energies undiminished, the following year he co-produced with Jeffrey St Clair Whiteout, an investigative study of the cia’s long-standing uses of the narcotics trade across the world for the financing of its undercover operations, and when Silverstein left CounterPunch to write a book of his own, St Clair joined Alexander on the paper as co-editor in early 1999. It was still a modest newsletter of six to eight pages, published out of Washington, appearing once every two weeks with a month of closure during the summer, whose circulation had not risen greatly above an initial thousand or so readers, to all intents and purposes existent only in print form. 

Overnight, 11 September 2001 changed this. That morning CounterPunch was online with its editors’ reaction. The response was electric. From then on, it went out daily, and its readership soared. By February 2002 it was being published from Petrolia, its infrastructure—material and financial—run by Alexander’s valiant friend and neighbour Becky Grant. For a few years, the website traffic of CounterPunch exceeded that of the Washington Post or Los Angeles Times. By 2007, Alexander and Jeff could write: ‘These days, at the end of each month here at CounterPunch, we can look at the daily breakdown of our 3 million or so hits, 300,000 page views and 100,000 unique visitors and see that we’ve had some 15,000 regular readers on us military bases around the world. For the time being, the old David vs Goliath struggle of the left pamphleteers battling the vast print combines of the news barons has equalled up.’ [36] 

Alexander’s life in Petrolia, as Jeff’s in Portland, was transformed by the demands of this take-off. For Alexander, CounterPunch became what The Week had been for Claud: a self-produced publication run on a shoe-string, in which he and his co-editor enjoyed a freedom of complete independence that no journalist working for a proprietor ever knows. Computer had replaced mimeograph, and commentary now capped inside story (with which Alexander’s brothers Andrew and Patrick kept the paper well supplied from Washington and the Mid-East). But the passion behind the project, the impetus of its attack, and—not least—the international range of its readership, unlike that of any other radical publication in the States before or since, were the same. 

In one regard, however, there was a difference. As a journalist, Claud was—temperamentally, if not always circumstantially—a singleton ace. Alexander was, strikingly, the opposite. Few writers of prose have been as inimitable, but extreme individuality of style did not spell any individualism of practice. His natural element was, on the contrary, collaboration. Of the seventeen books he published, thirteen were co-authored or co-edited. From Robin Blackburn to Jim Ridgeway, Andy Kopkind to Susanna Hecht, Ken Silverstein to Jeff St Clair, not to speak of JoAnn Wypijewski, without whom The Golden Age could never have taken the shape it did, he was continually engaged in common endeavours with companions of the left. [37] 

Connexion with the Nation had dwindled before CounterPunch took off. Once it did so, the tie became increasingly tenuous. In 2008, ‘Beat the Devil’—halved since 1997 [38] —was halved again, its appearance cut to once a month. The result was a relationship unhealthy on both sides: a contributor writing largely—perhaps only—to make ends meet, editors resenting the appearance of his best writing in his pages, not theirs. For the Nation he had been a magnet so long as there was a Republican Presidency. Once a Democrat was installed, he was inevitably less welcome. Navasky, who had hired Alexander, appreciated his circulation value, and was tolerant by disposition. But an indefatigable glad-hander, as affable with bankers, senators, industrialists, film stars and corporate lawyers as with staffers and interns, he could never be comfortable with what he called Alexander’s ‘vicious putdowns’ of so many amiable liberals—friends or contributors. [39]  His memoirs make it clear how much he preferred the company of Christopher Hitchens, to whom he devotes four times the space, regretting affectionately that he should eventually have left the Nation over his support for the war on Iraq, when the paper would have been happy to keep him. [40]  By that time, Alexander was by and large on sufferance, the Letters pages he had once lit up long gone, his fans preferring to find him elsewhere. When he died, he had become the longest-running columnist in the history of the magazine, in some sense a tribute to the forbearance of its editors; but as a relationship with any meaning the link had gone dead much earlier. 
Landscapes of decay 

A Colossal Wreck is, as it was designed to be, a sequel to The Golden Age Is In Us. But by reason of the changes in Alexander’s life once he moved to Petrolia, and its premature end, the book differs from its predecessor in a number of ways. How long he had been envisaging something of the sort is uncertain. When he faced death, in 2010, he told only his family. One could not have guessed it. Before he died, two years later, he worked on his voluminous files with the help of Daisy, reducing and arranging them for the book to come. He got about two-thirds of the way through this; the rest still to be done. Missing too is the way he would have integrated and framed the work as a whole. Yet the book has been edited with great intelligence and skill, and with this proviso, can be taken as close to what he would have wanted. It covers a much longer stretch of time than Golden Age—eighteen years rather than eight—and its entries are more serried, less meditative, reflecting altered rhythms of existence. In Petrolia, Alexander’s prodigious creative energies were directed not only to constructing, managing (and continually expanding) a kind of total micro-environment along the Mattole, but above all to running a far more intensive journalistic political enterprise than he had ever done before—daily, not weekly or fortnightly, in its demands. In its published form, the place of CounterPunch in the composition of A Colossal Wreck—the source, in one guise or another, of probably the larger part of it—is not to be seen; absent even from the index. That would certainly have been remedied had Alexander lived to frame the book. The tempo of the periodical can be felt in it. 

Politically, there was no let-up. In their User’s Manual of him in 2000, Cockburn and St Clair demolished Gore—yet more evangelical for foreign adventures than Clinton, lugging the ball and chain of Arkansan odium to his defeat. In 2004, ‘Anybody but Bush?’ exposed the hollowness of the claim that Kerry, flaunting his medals in Vietnam, while his spokesman explained he would not have changed his vote to attack Iraq even had he known it possessed no weapons of mass destruction, was a serious alternative to the incumbent: ‘The central political issue in America today is the decay of the political system, and of the two prime parties that share its spoils. Wherever one looks, at the gerrymandered districts, the balloting methods, the fundraising, corruption steams like vapours from a vast swamp.’ [41]  Instead of focussing relentlessly on which, the left would make itself ridiculous with indignation over Karl Rove’s ‘treason’ in leaking the identity of a cia agent, as if this would not have been a benefaction. The reality was that ‘Rove and Cheney are the White House’s answer to Bouvard and Pécuchet, counselors who have driven George W. Bush into the lowest ratings of any American President. Yet the left remains obsessed with their evil powers. Is there any better testimony to the vacuity and impotence of the endlessly touted “blogosphere”?’ [42] 

As early as 2006, before Obama was even a Presidential candidate, Alexander knew what to make of ‘the slithery junior Senator from Illinois’ and his ‘pulp of boosterism about the American dream’, remarking: ‘I used to think Senator Joe Lieberman was the man whose words I’d least like to be force-fed top volume if I was chained next to a loudspeaker in Camp Gitmo, but I think Obama is worse.’ [43]  A week before he was elected President in 2008, he wrote: ‘Those who claim that if he were white he would be cantering effortlessly into the White House do not understand that without his most salient physical characteristic, Obama would be seen as a second-tier Senator with unimpressive credentials.’ His one achievement was to amass a campaign treasury comprising ‘a vast hogswallow that, if it had been amassed by a Republican, would be the topic of thunderous liberal complaint’. [44]  That anyone could be disappointed in his tenure was risible. 

Such judgements of the nation’s political system spelt no alienation from the country itself. Rather the opposite: as the panorama of power and its fauna became ever more repellent, Alexander’s attachment to the physical and human landscape of America became, if anything, even stronger. His love of the interior, and respect for the ordinary people who live there, breathes through A Colossal Wreck from beginning to end. ‘He could get interested in anyone or anything, which is why he could get on so well with children’, Andrew remarks in his introduction, rightly singling out description of a passage through Midland, the small oil town in Texas where Bush Jr grew up, as characteristic of his brother’s extraordinary sense of persons and places. [45]  On eventually acquiring us nationality in late 2009, Alexander could observe: ‘I’ve lived in every quadrant of the United States and driven across it maybe forty times—not hard when you live in the west and buy old cars from a friend in the southeast. I know the place as well if not better than many.’ [46]  He was completely at ease with everyone he met—his description of Claud no less true of himself: ‘He was learned but never overbearing, cultivated but never patronizing. He respected and enjoyed people at all social levels and ages.’ [47] 

What did this feeling for l’Amérique profonde, as Robin Blackburn has called it, mean for his politics? Writing from the Adobe motel in Aptos in November 1989, in the last piece he ever published in the tls, Alexander commented on a year-long strike of agricultural packing workers in Watsonville: ‘America is far more radical than many people imagine.’ [48]  Wherever there was resistance to the order of capital, he responded at full pitch to it. A decade later, he celebrated a high-water mark: 

Beyond the wildest hopes of the street warriors, five days in Seattle brought us one victory after another. The protesters—initially shunned and denounced by the respectable ‘inside strategists’, despised by the press, gassed and bloodied by the cops and national guard—shut down the opening ceremony, prevented Clinton from addressing the wto delegates at the Wednesday night gala, turned the corporate press from prim denunciations of ‘mindless anarchy’ to bitter criticisms of police brutality, and forced the wto to cancel its closing ceremonies and to adjourn in disorder and confusion, without an agenda for the next round. 

In the annals of popular protest in America these were shining hours, achieved entirely outside the conventional arena of orderly protest and white-paper activism and the timid bleats of the professional leadership of big labour and environmentalists. This truly was an insurgency from below in which all those who strove to moderate and deflect the turbulent flood of popular outrage managed to humiliate themselves. [49] 

But after Seattle? Earlier that year, he had observed: ‘As a force capable of reinvigorating our political dna the left is in terrible shape.’ [50]  In the new century, matters worsened: after its disastrous failure to bring the Democratic administration to book in the nineties, there was a steady decline in the political confidence and ambition of the left; absence of any coherent strategy or theory under Bush; fading even of mobilization against the war in Iraq. The Democrats had recaptured Congress in 2006 in the wake of its setbacks: ‘The irony is that this sharp disillusion of the voters owes almost nothing to any anti-war movement. To say the anti-war movement is dead would be an overstatement, but not by a large margin.’ [51]  It was enough to compare its drip-feed with opposition to the wars in Vietnam and Central America. Non-profit foundations had reduced most of the ‘progressive sector’ to dependency on corporate philanthropy, while most of the sectarian groups that once provided ‘a training ground for young people who could learn the rudiments of political economy and organizational discipline, find suitable mates, and play their role in reproducing the left’ had collapsed. [52]  With the deaths of Said and Sonnenberg, losses he felt as acutely as of Kopkind, fellow spirits had thinned too. [53] 

But jeremiads were alien to him. Throughout his life, Alexander was affirmative in every instinct. As a polemicist he was savage, but never bitter. It was a maxim of Claud’s, which he would often repeat: ‘You don’t get far by making people feel bad.’ [54]  A left that was a continual bearer of dire tidings was self-defeating. As he himself put it: ‘You can’t go through life just holding your nose.’ [55]  He would rebuke anyone culpable of what he regarded as a needless pessimism—more than once myself (I naturally denied the charge). [56]  In his last years, that warmth and confidence of outlook, expression of both temperament and conviction, did not disappear with the enfeeblement of the left, but under its pressure, a displacement occurred. Who now was harnessing ‘those vital, idealistic energies that always move through the American firmament, awaiting release’? [57]  Increasingly, radicalism had migrated to the right. For two decades, though no less impotent than the left, it was thence that 80 per cent of the political energy in the country had come. Contrary to the contemptuous diatribes of the left, the Tea Party was a genuine popular movement—if only of ‘the fury and frustration of a huge slab of white Americans running small businesses’—such as it had failed to generate. Elsewhere ‘abandoned constituencies’ written off as uneducable were falling back on the Bill of Rights and Second Amendment. [58]  They had his sympathy. 

In this frame of mind, he parted company on two issues with those who most admired him. Fire-arms he defended as a patrimony of the American Revolution, whose rifle shows were vibrant displays of anti-government strains in popular culture. The price for gun control, in handing more power to the state, would be greater than any gain in safety. Global warming he dismissed as fear-mongering. The two positions, often taxed with a common know-nothing populism, differed. The first was in tune with a popular constituency of real depth, on a relatively marginal question in the larger scheme of American capitalism, about which no politician in the country called for more than tinkering. The second, on a fundamental question where popular feeling was by and large a bemused indifference, had corporate backing from the extractive and chemical industries. What prompted Alexander’s quixotic attacks on ‘warmism’, as he called it? A craftsman’s suspicion of big science; over-reliance on friends felt to speak with authority on the subject; attachment to barouches predating catalytic converters; perhaps an element of épater—he refused political correctness in any form. [59]  Aware of his isolation on the topic, he was sensitive about it, resigning from nlr in 2010 over Mike Davis’s essay on the Anthropocene, though returning not long afterwards. [60]  In each of these quirks of his last years, he was personally at variance with himself. The defender of hunting culture was a lover of animals, who so far as one knew never loosed off a weapon in his life; the denier of climate change was a passionate campaigner against logging and champion of wild-life. [61] 
Qualities of freedom 

How then are Alexander’s politics best described? There was a seemingly paradoxical, in reality dialectical, tension in them. He was at once a libertarian and a Leninist. In his make-up, the balance between the two could shift—a libertarian Leninist at the beginning, was he closer to a Leninist libertarian at the end?—but their delicate interplay marked him throughout. The last burst of left activism in his life-time was the Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011. How did he react to it? ‘The strength of the ows movement lies in the simplicity and truth of its basic message: the few are rich, the many are poor. In terms of its pretensions the capitalist system has failed’, he commented. ‘But for all its simplicity and truth, how much staying power does the ows message have as presently deployed? In terms of its powers of repression, the system has not failed. To date, the ows movement has not even confronted the moneyed elite with a threat on the scale of the 1999 protests in Seattle.’ [62] owsers, as he called them—read: political browsers—were certainly better than pwogs—another coinage—of the liberal establishment. But they lacked much historical memory or coherent strategy. In his best mocking—not annihilating—vein, he concluded: 

It must be the dratted Leninist in me, even after years of therapy. Surfeited with somewhat turgid paeans to the democratic gentility of the owsers, I clamber up to the dusty top shelf, furtively haul down Vladimir Ilyich’s ‘April Theses’ of 1917 and dip in: end the war, confiscate the big estates, immediately merge all the banks into one general national bank . . . The blood flows back into my cheeks, my eyes sparkle. Then, hearing my daughter’s footfall outside the library, I shove Lenin back into place, scuttle back down the ladder and pluck a copy of E. F. Schumacher, even though I’m not at all sure what is on the owsers’ reading lists or Twitter menu. [63] 

Zuccotti Park was a far cry from Syntagma Square, but it was early days. For opposition to the system to have a future, it would have to be less bon enfant. After addressing one of the few, small rallies against the war in Afghanistan, he noted: ‘There’s no sign of populism in any energetic form. The anger is formulaic.’ [64]  Alexander loved America, but as the title of A Colossal Wreck makes clear, it was without an iota of complacency about it. On taking us citizenship in the end, thirty-seven years after arriving in New York, he wrote: ‘I have plenty of positive thoughts about America and am very happy to be stepping aboard a sinking ship.’ [65] 

As an individual, one is tempted to say Alexander came about as close to Marx’s image of an existence emancipated after capitalism had passed away, and with it money and marriage, as perhaps anyone could. He drove, phoned, read, cooked, courted, gardened, decorated, photographed and wrote with the same combination of grace and élan: a revolutionary sprezzatura all his own. Mental and manual labour, the skills of the hand and the arts of the mind, were undivided in him. He was like a three-dimensional materialism come to life. Exceptional temperaments like his are beyond imitation. Yet though they cannot offer existential models, they may suggest regulative ideals: ‘by the quality of life, art and freedom that radicals commend, so will radicals prevail’. [66] 

Politically, on the other hand, the example Alexander set retains full force. The newest levies of the American left are in better shape, intellectually at any rate, than he may have realized. There, energy and imagination are not in short supply. It is enough to consider the three most impressive publications to emerge in the Bush–Obama era, n+1, Jacobin and Endnotes, each in its own register—respectively: cultural, social and economic—expressing a clear-cut rejection of the established order. Every generation has to find its own way to that break, be it by Kulturkritik, protest report, or value-theory. Striking, however, is the paradox of a common sensibility: what can be described as an apolitical anti-capitalism—deeply hostile to the system of capital, but largely mute before the embodiments of its power, and operations of its empire. [67] CounterPunch makes no such nicety. In directing it with an inexpugnable refusal of any paltering or temporization, Alexander put politics in command. A Colossal Wreck stands as an inspiration to do likewise.



 [1] ‘Alexander Cockburn, 1941–2012’, nlr 76, July–Aug 2012; ‘Remembering Alex’, Nation, 13–20 August 2012. 

 [2] In Time of Trouble, London 1957; Crossing the Line, London 1958; View from the West, London 1961. Mysteriously, in keeping with its author, the American edition of the first volume of the trilogy, which appeared a year earlier under the title A Discord of Trumpets, includes one chapter and a good part of another that were cut in the English edition, where a vivid account of Claud’s near-execution by Durruti in Aragon is for reasons unknown missing. 

 [3] Richard Ingrams explains that when he co-founded Private Eye, he had ‘Cockburn’s example very much in mind’. See his memoir of Claud, introducing the 1985 re-edition of The Years of the Week (published, no doubt to thwart a bailiff, in Patricia’s name), which originally came out in 1968, and can be regarded as a fourth volume parallel to Claud’s autobiographical trilogy. Patricia’s own memoirs, fully as remarkable as her husband’s, appeared as Figure of Eight in 1985. 

 [4] View from the West, p. 82. 

 [5] ‘Those early years in Budapest during the inflation time, when the value of money in your pocket could be halved between breakfast and lunch, and halved again before dinner, had made it hard for me to focus at all steadily on financial problems, or to treat such problems otherwise than as entirely fluid and impalpable’: In Time of Trouble, p. 83. 

 [6] In Time of Trouble, pp. 106–22. 

 [7] Crossing the Line, pp. 104, 140–3. 

 [8] Great Day Coming: A Memoir of the 1930s, South Royalton 1994, p. 2 ff, which contains the best independent portrait of him—affectionate, restrained, not uncritical—at that time. Some forty years earlier, she wrote a review of the first volume of his memoirs, to some extent inflected by a rebound from communism, but in the Cold War context of the time by no means hostile: ‘From Pollitt to “Punch”’, The New Leader, 20 August 1956. 

 [9] ‘Catch 22’, nlr 1/18, Jan–Feb 1963, pp. 87–92. 

 [10] Fifty years later, his most striking contribution, ‘In Carcinoma City’, a review of Mailer’s American Dream, which appeared in its issue of 29 April 1965, was re-excerpted by the paper on 23 December 2013. 

 [11] Times Literary Supplement, 29 July 1965. 

 [12] The Incompatibles: Trade Union Militancy and the Consensus, Harmondsworth 1967 and Student Power, Harmondsworth 1969. 

 [13] Corruptions of Empire, London and New York 1998, p. 386. Henceforward ce. 

 [14] ‘Ulster: History’s Blind Alley’, New Statesman, 3 January 1969, pp. 8–12, where ‘We Shall Overcome’, sung on a civil-rights march, is ‘that wet anthem of hope’. 

 [15] See ‘Cool in the Street’, Mayday, 8–15 November 1968; ‘Armed Struggle in Ireland’, Hard Times, 17 April–4 May 1970; ‘England Swings’, Hard Times, 29 June–6 July 1970. Ridgeway merged Hard Times with Ramparts in 1972. 

 [16] Among contributors also writing for nlr at the time were Peter Wollen, Tom Nairn, Fred and Jon Halliday, Gareth Stedman Jones. Besides extensive coverage of industrial struggles and popular resistance to the military occupation of Northern Ireland, the paper took up issues of gay and women’s liberation, mental health and prison conditions that were widely raised only later. In retrospect, its section on ideas—a series dealing in turn with capitalism, patriotism, internationalism, materialism, Keynesianism, surrealism, etc.—stands out, along with its commitment, with very limited resources, to photojournalism. After it closed in March 1972, a special issue hailing the Vietnamese offensive in Easter of that year came out, nevertheless, in May. 

 [17] A Colossal Wreck, London and New York 2013, p. 351. Henceforward acw.

 [18] The only title to appear under the Voice imprint was his own Idle Passion: Chess and the Dance of Death, which came out in 1974, and is notable especially for its chapter on the successes and ironies of chess—an art-for-art’s sake activity if there ever was one—as a pastime promoted by the state in the Soviet Union for the masses: pp. 146–55. The book is written in what is still closer to a classical English than a naturalized style. 

 [19] For which see ce, pp. 187–92. 

 [20] Compare acw, p. 269, with In Time of Trouble, p. 158, where Claud supplies a lively enumeration of assorted affectations and failings in his early prose. 

 [21] Private Eye, of course, has long targeted ‘the Street of Shame’. But its darts are mostly sub-political—gadfly gossip picking at scandal rather than demolishing cant or mystification. 

 [22] For his eviction from the Voice and arrival at the Nation, see the editorial by David Schneiderman and Alexander’s reply in the Voice, 18–24 January 1984—followed by the protests of the paper’s readers, 1–7 February—and the editorial by Victor Navasky in the Nation, 18 February 1984. Many years later, Alexander would recall that the first item he ever wrote for the Voice about Palestinians, around 1973, was censored by it: see ‘Palestine Down the Decades’, in End Times: The Death of the Fourth Estate, co-edited with Jeffrey St Clair, Petrolia and Oakland 2007, p. 327. 

 [23] acw, p. 296—after which Alexander proceeds to mordant judgement of the ‘pell-mell bluster’ of gonzo journalism in general and Hunter S. Thompson in particular—‘like Evel Knievel, Thompson’s stunts demanded that he arc higher and further with each successive sentence’s outrage to propriety’. 

 [24] Smoke: Another Jimmy Carter Adventure, New York 1978, and Political Ecology, New York 1979, notable for Alexander’s dantesque description of the New York subway of the period, ‘Cattlecar Civilization’, pp. 159 ff , and the editors’ concluding reflections on the ambiguous implications for women’s liberation of mass female entry into the work-force, under the reign of capital: pp. 396–402 ff. 

 [25] Compare the ending of ‘The Left, the Democrats and the Future’, of 21 July 1984, ce, pp. 374–5, with his remarks two months later: ‘They keep saying that the best reason to vote for Walter Mondale is Ronald Reagan. But since Mondale filed to change his name and political identity to Reagan halfway through September, this argument doesn’t carry quite the weight that it once did’: ce, p. 378. For Jackson, see his interim judgement at the Atlanta Convention of the Democratic Party in the summer of 1988, and definitive one of the left Jackson came to represent, much later: ‘Its national champions—Bernard Sanders, Jesse Jackson, Michael Moore, Jim Hightower—are all phonies’: Imperial Crusades, London and New York 2004, p. 52. 

 [26] ce, p. 399. 

 [27] ce, pp. 136–7: ‘If it were the Pentagon threatening such destruction by aerial bombardment, there might be a shred of hope. In all likelihood the projectiles would fall far from their targets and merely disintegrate an unoffending hospital or school. But with real-estate developers, we do not even have the comfort of this uncertainty. Comes the demolition order and the wreckers march at dawn.’ 

 [28] The Golden Age Is In Us, London and New York 1995, p. 186. Henceforward ga. 

 [29] ce, p. 14. 

 [30] ga, p. 330; acw, p. 73. 

 [31] ga, p. 346.

 [32] ga, pp. 110–1, 77, 223–4. 

 [33] ga, p. 5.

 [34] Rush Limbaugh ‘the dirigible of drivel’, Sidney Blumenthal that ‘notorious Clinton brown-noser’, Michael Kinsley ‘entering holy orders at the Cathedral of St Microsoft in Seattle’, Thomas Friedman ‘maturing in the cask of self-importance at the New York Times’. More clearly even than in Corruptions of Empire, a chronological line is drawn between the early to mid-seventies and what followed: ‘The story of Washington Babylon is of how a moment of optimism in American political life, in the immediate aftermath of Watergate and the exposure of that scandal, was betrayed and destroyed. What’s remarkable, indeed, is how the Nixon era, when contrasted with the current state of affairs, seems like an age of enlightenment and promise’: Washington Babylon, London and New York 2000, pp. 11, 7, 25–6, vii–ix. 

 [35] High Low Washington, New York 1932, pp. 267–8.

 [36] End Times, pp. 1–2. ‘David and Goliath’ was the title Claud gave to his chapter on Otto Schuette’s use of the ‘humble mimeograph machine’ in his successful battle with the radio combine in High Low Washington: pp. 161–2, 21. Alexander, celebrating the internet as a successor, cautioned against imagining it made up for other deficiencies: ‘For now, at least, we have the web. We’re infinitely better off than we were thirty years ago. The only trouble is, the left hasn’t got too many ideas. We should stop whining about the corporate press and get on with a new programme’: End Times, p. 108. 

 [37] For recollections of their time working together with him, see Jeff St Clair, ‘Farewell, Alex, My Friend’, CounterPunch, 23–25 July 2012; James Ridgeway, ‘Remembering Alex Cockburn: Sharing a column, plenty of arguments, and even more laughs with one of America’s sharpest poison pens’, Mother Jones, 23 July 2012; and Ken Silverstein, ‘A Brilliant Life: Remembering Alexander Cockburn’, Harper’s, 25 July 2012.

 [38] For his dignified reaction to the change, see ‘Satan Lite’, Nation, 5 May 1997. 

 [39] ‘Alexander Cockburn: He Beat the Devil’, Nation, 13–20 August 2012. 

 [40] Compare A Matter of Opinion, New York 2005, pp. 246 and 189–91, etc. Of himself, Navasky writes disarmingly: ‘I was, I guess, what would be called a left-liberal, although I never thought of myself as all that left’: p. 111. 

 [41] nlr 29, Sept–Oct 2004, p. 23.

 [42] acw, p. 344. 

 [43] acw, pp. 357–8. 

 [44] acw, p. 411. 

 [45] acw, pp. ix–x. 

 [46] acw, p. 444. 

 [47] acw, p. 269.

 [48] ‘Convulsions in California’, Times Literary Supplement, 3 November 1989. 

 [49] acw, pp. 159–60. This passage comes from the work of vivid reportage and analysis on the rising and its aftermath, co-authored with Jeff St Clair, 5 Days That Shook the World: Seattle and Beyond, London and New York 2000, p. 113.

 [50] acw, p. 148. Among its deformations, he had noted already in the nineties, was an obsession with conspiracy theories, from Kennedy’s assassination to the attacks of 9/11. Of the former, he incurred the ire of Oliver Stone for his famous dictum: ‘Whether jfk was killed by a lone assassin or by a conspiracy has as much to do with the subsequent contours of American politics as if he had tripped over one of Caroline’s dolls and broken his neck in the White House nursery’: ga, p. 253. 

 [51] ‘Whatever Happened to the Anti-War Movement?’, nlr 46, July–Aug 2007, p. 29. 

 [52] acw, p. 456. 

 [53] He wrote elegies for all three: Andy Kopkind in ga, pp. 420–4, Edward Said in acw, pp. 242–4, Ben Sonnenberg in acw, pp. 470–4.

 [54] ce, p. 402. 

 [55] ga, p. 300. 

 [56] Inter alia, 5 Days That Shook the World, p. 4. 

 [57] ‘Anybody but Bush?’, p. 25. 

 [58] acw, pp. 476, 23. 

 [59] In the nineties, ‘suddenly we were in the wastelands of Political Correctness’, he noted, where ‘sexual preference (non-heterosexual) became lgbtq, though another capital may have been added while my back was turned’: acw, p. 533. 

 [60] For the position that provoked him: Mike Davis, ‘Who Will Build the Ark?’, nlr 61, Jan–Feb 2010, pp. 29–46. Alexander had been a great admirer of Mike’s City of Quartz, of which he wrote certainly the finest notice: see ‘The Power of Sunshine’, London Review of Books, 10 January 1991. 

 [61] For this radical, anti-capitalist environmentalism, see one of his most eloquent essays: ‘“Win-Win” with Bruce Babbitt: The Clinton Administration Meets the Environment’, nlr 1/201, Sept–Oct 1993, pp. 46–59. 

 [62] acw, p. 513. 

 [63] acw, p. 512. For how seriously Alexander took questions of organization and strategy, in no formulaic spirit, see the series of reflections on the short-term power of demonstrations, the rarity of catching the state by surprise, the long-term requirements of building a movement, and the need for tactics of ‘publicity, harassment, obstructionism’, in 5 Days That Shook the World, pp. 9–10, 117.

 [64] acw, p. 450. 

 [65] acw, p. 444. 

 [66] For this credo of Alexander’s, see the full passage: ‘By Way of an Introduction’, Serpents in the Garden: Liaisons with Culture & Sex, co-edited with Jeff St Clair, Petrolia and Oakland 2004, p. ix. 

 [67] Jacobin, dedicating its summer issue of 2012 to Alexander, managed to publish in the same number an inconspicuous summons to its readers to vote for Obama, containing scarcely a mention of the world beyond America, let alone—not a single word—about the role of his administration in it. So too, with varying degrees of reserve or enthusiasm, in blogs rather than printed articles in the journal, the editors of n+1 curtsied bashfully to the Lord of the Drones. American self-absorption accounts, of course, for some of this, as if only what happens to us citizens really matters. Endnotes, which is considerably further to the left and has British origins, does not suffer from the same blindness, but engagement with the American political order or imperial system does not feature among its concerns. It would be wrong to make too much of this pattern, bantam-weight enough—not to be equated with the congenital parasitism of traditional liberal organs on the Democratic Party. The merits and interest of all three periodicals are much more significant than their failings.

Perry Anderson: HOMELAND

New Left Review 81, May-June 2013 


The American political scene since 2000 is conventionally depicted in high colour. For much native—not to speak of foreign—opinion, the country has cartwheeled from brutish reaction under one ruler, presiding over disaster at home and abroad, to the most inspiring hope of progress since the New Deal under another, personifying all that is finest in the nation; to others, a spectre not even American. For still others, the polarization of opinion they represent is cause for despair, or alternatively comfort in the awakening of hitherto marginalized identities to the threshold of a new majority. The tints change by the light in which they are seen. 

For a steadier view of us politics, line is more reliable than colour. It is the parameters of the system of which its episodes are features that require consideration. These compose a set of four determinants. The first, and far the most fundamental, of these, is the historical regime of accumulation in question, governing the returns on capital and rate of growth of the economy. [1] The second are structural shifts in the sociology of the electorate distributed between the two political parties. The third are cultural mutations in the value-system at large within the society. Fourth and last—the residual—are the aims of the active minorities in the voter-base of each party. The political upshot at any given point of time can be described, short-hand, as a resultant of this unequal quartet of forces in motion. 

What remains unchanging, on the other hand, is the monochrome ideological universe in which the system is plunged: an all-capitalist order, without a hint of social-democratic weakness or independent political organization by labour. [2] The two parties that inhabit it, Republican and Democratic, have exchanged social and regional bases more than once since the Civil War, without either ever questioning the rule of capital. Since the 1930s there has been a general, if not invariable, tendency for those at the bottom of the income pyramid—should they cast a ballot, which large numbers do not—to vote Democrat, and those at the top, Republican. Such preferences reflect the policies by and large pursued by the two parties: Democratic administrations have typically been more redistributive downwards than Republican, in an alignment shadowing, without exactly reproducing, divisions between left and right elsewhere. But these are rarely differences of principle. A salient feature of the consensus on which the system rests is the flexibility of relative positions it allows. Policies associated with one party can migrate to the other, not infrequently assuming forms in the cross-over more radical than they possessed in their original habitat. A glance at the history of the past half-century is a reminder of these eddies within the system. 
1

Although it was some time before its character crystallized, Roosevelt’s victory in 1932 famously opened a new era in American politics. The Depression, marking the end of a regime of accumulation based on the gold standard, high tariffs, low taxation and still early forms of mass production, discredited the Republicans who had long dominated it. Under the shock of the slump, popular pressures—above all, the labour strikes that began in 1934—drove the Democratic Administration beyond its initial measures of financial stabilization and emergency relief towards social reforms and infrastructural programmes that consolidated its electoral base, while the shake-out of least competitive capitals and corporate concentration continued. [3] When the sharp recession of 1937 struck, unemployment was soon back up at 12.5 per cent. What transformed the New Deal into the watershed it became was the arrival of massive state demand with rearmament. With the onset of a full war economy, from late 1941 onwards, a new regime of accumulation came of age. The gold standard had gone. Taxation was higher; deficits were no longer taboo; deposit insurance and banking regulation were in place; corporations had concentrated; consumer demand had expanded. These were conditions of the transformation. But the decisive change came with the huge jump in state spending and intervention in the economy, public expenditures soaring from 19 per cent to 47 per cent in two years, when the country was mobilized for war and business returned to the seats of power in Washington to run the industrial drive for victory. Firing technological innovation and wiping out unemployment, the war-time boom delivered American supremacy over the capitalist world after 1945, with an international economic order to fit its requirements at Bretton Woods. The expansion unleashed by the war economy rolled on for a quarter-century of high growth rates at home and unchallenged hegemony abroad. 

The political system formed under this regime, though it descended from the New Deal, also differed from it. After the war the Democrats maintained the electoral dominance they had secured in the thirties, when they won first-time voters and second-generation immigrants, once-distant Protestant workers and northern blacks, while keeping a tight grip on their historic stronghold in the racist South. While the two parties divided control of the White House evenly, from 1948 to 1968 each winning it three times, Congress remained for nearly half a century a Democratic preserve; between 1932 and 1980, the Republicans took it just twice, for a pittance of four years. But the underlying political configuration encompassed both parties. After 1937, when the steel strike was broken and the economy slid back into recession, the labour insurgency that had forced the most significant social reforms onto Roosevelt’s agenda was spent. The Wagner Act allowed unionization to increase up to the early fifties; but along with growth in membership came bureaucratization and domestication of the afl–cio. In 1947, a majority in both parties joined forces to repress militants and strikes with the Taft–Hartley Act. [4]

Collective labour was one thing, to be curbed wherever it risked becoming unruly. Atomized voters were another, to be courted so long as the price could be afforded. If state spending as a proportion of gdp was no longer at war-time levels, the long boom of the fifties and sixties yielded rates of profit permitting regular wage gains for workers, and tax revenues for continuing public works and social benefits, along with large military budgets. But no regime of accumulation is static, and in due course there was an inflexion. War-time planners in Washington had envisaged a post-war world in which a dollar standard and free trade would deliver export prosperity for us capital via economic recovery in Europe and Japan. The extent of damage in former allies and enemies alike, and the over-riding imperatives of the Cold War, forced this design out of shape. To save capitalism abroad, pure free trade would have to be diluted, local rulers allowed some start-up assistance and a measure of protection for their markets, if they were not to sink back into depression. Recovery came, and as anticipated, American profits with it. But since labour costs were lower abroad, it was more rational for us capital to invest—where possible: Europe rather than Japan—locally in production for local markets, typically at higher rates of profit than available in domestic investment, rather than export to them. With the great expansion of American multi-national corporations overseas, organized labour was further weakened, not legislatively but structurally, from the mid-fifties onwards.

Yet so long as the overall regime of accumulation held, the calculus of party competition kept the parameters inherited from the New Deal in place. Within them, Republican rulers were perfectly capable of outflanking Democratic predecessors. Truman, whose Presidency was largely barren of domestic legislative achievement, broke more strikes than Eisenhower, whose Interstate Highway Act launched the biggest public-works programme since the wpa. Anti-segregation activism and ghetto insurrections wrested the Civil Rights Act and the War on Poverty from lbj, with a momentum that outlasted him. It was Nixon, not Johnson, who oversaw the largest increase in social entitlements and economic regulation of post-war history, and proposed the most ambitious anti-poverty scheme, a guaranteed minimum income that no capitalist country has yet instituted. At Congressional level, where in both Houses the most rock-solid single bloc of Democrats was always from the South, Republicans voted in larger numbers than Democrats for the civil-rights bills. 
2

Across the advanced capitalist world, the post-war boom came to an abrupt halt in the early seventies. Profitability declined, wages ceased to rise, and stagflation set in. The common cause lay in the inter-capitalist competition that had been intensifying since Germany and Japan, restored by Washington as forward defences of the Free World, had re-entered the world market in force, often with newer capital stock and superior corporate and banking structures. [5] Forced to defend sunk capital that could not readily be written off, American firms faced lower margins just as unwelcome social spending and costly regulation were hitting a peak under a Republican president. To cap everything, after cutting the link of the dollar to gold, Nixon resorted to wage and price controls to throttle inflation. Faced with this combination of economic crisis and political profligacy, capital—big and small—sprang into action. The Business Roundtable was set up in 1972. By the end of the decade the Chamber of Commerce and National Federation of Independent Business had doubled their membership, and corporate lobbyists in Washington multiplied over ten-fold; political action committees funded by capital far outdistanced those of labour, and hard-hitting new think-tanks—the American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute—were at battle stations. [6] The breakdown of steady growth generated a systematic mobilization against the post-war settlement. 

Such was the setting in which the agenda of a new regime of accumulation took shape. The neo-liberal order ahead would include deregulation of markets, de-unionization of labour, decreases in taxation and deflation of the money supply—in effect, a reversion towards norms of the original liberal regime prior to the Depression, minus the gold standard and tariff protection. But there would be two critical differences, in the position of industry and the nature of the electorate. Manufacturing, just burgeoning into mass production in the twenties, with fifty years of expansion ahead of it, would from the eighties onwards contract relentlessly under the pressure of lower-cost producers abroad, displacing capital into finance as the command-centre of the economy, and yet more drastically eroding the position of labour. At the same time voter expectations now precluded wholesale liquidation of insolvent or inefficient enterprises: mass unemployment appeared incompatible with stable capitalist rule. In most capitalist countries of the period, analogous changes took hold. But in the absence of any significant traditions critical of the over-riding prerogatives of private property and free enterprise, and the structural erosion of the power of labour, in America they acquired their purest form. The parameters of the political system shifted to the right everywhere in the West, but nowhere so far and with so little impediment as in the us.

At party level, after a high tide of progressive reform under a Republican president, the backwash of political reaction came with a Democrat in the White House, and an overwhelming Democratic majority—292–143 in the House and 62–38 in the Senate—in Congress. Less state, more market was the solution to the woes of the economy at the arrival of the bicentennial. The keynotes of the Carter Administration were tight money and deregulation, to weaken labour and strengthen business. In Congress, the Democrats lowered the capital-gains tax and raised the payroll levy, while—in one vote after another—rejecting reform of health care, indexation of the minimum wage, consumer protection and improvement of electoral registration. At the Fed, Volcker was entrusted with a hard deflation. Neo-liberalism was now in the saddle. The short-term cost for Carter and his party was high, when the steep interest rates that were Volcker’s cure for inflation provoked a severe recession. The electorate was not grateful. But a larger problem lay in the lack of an ideological message from the Democrats capable of embellishing the turn in any terms less dour than the need for belt-tightening. Something more alluring was needed. 

Reagan’s victory in 1980, as decisive as Roosevelt’s in 1932, met the requirement. Neo-liberalism found its popular supplement in an optimism of national reassertion and moralism of individual self-reliance, laced—if not excessively—with faith in the Bible. [7] This was an ideological encapsulation with which the Democrats were hard put to compete. Though they had pioneered the neo-liberal turn, they were handicapped by identification with the order that had preceded it, in which they had so long been the dominant party. The Republicans, with no comparable difficulty of adjustment, became the natural party of government in a political system whose centre of gravity had shifted structurally to the right. The new regime of accumulation favoured them. 
3

Behind the shift in partisan ascendancy lay also sociological changes. The first of these affected the white working class. Hard-hat backlash against anti-war demonstrations and school bussing had already produced a patriotic and racial vote for Wallace in 1968, and a greater one for Nixon in 1972. But with real wages falling after 1972, and fiscal creep biting into take-home pay, workers now also had fewer material reasons for loyalty to the Democratic Party. Carter had abandoned them. Many abandoned him. Reagan won a majority of them in 1980 and a much larger one in 1984. The second change was the shift in population and wealth from the Northeast and Centre of the country to the West and Southwest, where capital was newer and less trammelled, urban patterns more dispersed, traditions of labour organization weaker and frontier imaginaries stronger. There, in California, a revolt against property taxes of home-owners financed by real-estate developers had already passed Proposition 13, putting Carter’s Revenue Act of the same year in the shade. For a century, no presidential candidate had ever come from the region. Then from the same springboard came Goldwater, Nixon and Reagan. Finally and most decisively, the South—always the most conservative part of the country, which the memory of Lincoln’s victory in the Civil War had for a century made a Democratic bastion—had started to become Republican in the aftermath of Johnson’s conversion to civil rights. Its transfer as a regional bloc from one party to the other, the largest single shift in the electorate since Abolition, was gradual. [8] Thirty years later, when the South was posting the fastest economic growth in the country, it would be close to total.

Sweeping victory at the polls on a platform of freeing enterprise from government at home, and re-establishing American power and confidence abroad, gave Reagan a mandate for a radical shift in what was possible to enact in Washington. Without delay, he pushed through the most far-reaching overhaul of the tax structure on record—lowering rates for all, but heavily weighted towards the rich—and broke the first national strike that came his way, by the air-traffic controllers’ union. These were highly popular moves, enjoying bipartisan support and wide public approval. But though a great political success, the tax-cuts were no remedy for the Volcker recession, and had to be partly retracted, before another round followed in Reagan’s second term. But neo-liberal recipes could no more be taken pure economically than ideologically: in practice, a large dose of military Keynesianism was required to keep growth going, as steep increases in defence expenditure primed demand, generating annual deficits three times higher than under Carter. After 1985, the shake-out of the Volcker recession and a lowering of the dollar, combined with wage-repression and fiscal hand-outs, allowed manufacturing exports to recover, restoring corporate profitability. Yet the performance of the American economy did not substantially improve. The initially high dollar, attracting foreign capital, accelerated the rise of the financial sector and widened the trade deficit. Overall growth was less than in the seventies. By the end of the Reagan era, its epilogue under the first Bush, the federal debt had tripled. The underlying impasse of the long downturn had not been resolved.
4

The Democrats were meanwhile adjusting to the parameters of the new order, as the Republicans had done to the old one. Within a year of Reagan’s re-election in 1984, the Democratic Leadership Council was formed to reposition the party in line with the requirements of the time—shedding outdated commitments to public spending, labour or welfare dependents for a ‘new centrism’, champion of a leaner state at home and a more resolute one abroad. By the turn of the nineties, mass movements of any kind—labour, student, black, feminist, rainbow—had vanished from the scene. Picked by the media as the most reassuring candidate from the dlc, Clinton took the Presidency in 1992 on a split vote, Perot dividing the Republican electorate in a recession year. Once in the White House, he took the opposite path to Reagan—raising taxes to reduce the deficit, in the belief that bond markets held the key to business confidence as the engine of growth. Welfare reform, disciplining outlays to dependents, sent another strong signal to the markets that this was a responsible Administration. The recession faded, the budget went into surplus, and at the end of Clinton’s second term, the economy expanded at a hectic clip.

But the boom was no healthier than Reagan’s, since the debt expunged from the public accounts reappeared, vastly magnified, in private accounts, household and corporate, in the wake of the financial deregulation that became the signature drive of the Clinton Presidency. The repeal of Glass–Steagall demolished New Deal separation of investment from retail banking, and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act lifted any restraint on trades in over-the-counter derivatives. [9] With a return to the high dollar, foreign capital flooded into the stock market, while profitability in manufacturing declined once again. In the artificial flush of Clinton’s last years, mortgage liabilities were stoked by lavish government loans, corporations borrowed against their own share prices, speculation in hi-tech start-ups exploded, and equities soared. Effectively, asset-price Keynesianism had replaced fiscal-military Keynesianism, doping domestic demand enough to return briefly to higher growth. 

Behind this change lay an inflexion in the regime of accumulation operative since the early eighties, comparable to that of the mid-fifties in the antecedent regime. Once again, the change came from abroad. This time it was the full-scale entry of China into the world market that governed it—lowering labour costs dramatically across manufacturing; at once widening and bank-rolling the American trade deficit; propelling us assembly-lines out to China; fuelling fictive capital at home. [10] The Reverse Plaza Accord of 1995 to revalue the dollar proved the tipping-point, at once for outsourcing of manufacturing to the prc and insourcing of money for the stock and real-estate bubbles of the end of the century. In contrast to the thirties and eighties, but in this too like the fifties, the change was not primed by an intellectual model, but presented on a plate by global conditions. Banks and corporations, hedge funds and start-ups reaped the benefits of the planetary expansion of the world-capitalist economy under American monetary domination, extolled ex post facto as ‘globalization’, and ‘the great moderation’. The inflexion was not a departure from the neo-liberal order as conceived in Vienna, Chicago or Minnesota, but a deepening of it.

Politically, Clintonism appeared to have made Democratic rule competitive with Republican under conditions at the outset less favourable to it: not only speeding up financialization of the economy, while restoring budgetary balance, but transmitting a glow of prosperity to the modest as well as the opulent. In 1996 bankers and voters alike gave thumbs up to the President for a second term, Clinton raising more money than Dole on Wall Street, and taking thirty-one states and close to half the electorate: not a triumph on Reagan’s scale, but healthy enough, with a promisingly wide gender gap—11 per cent—as pledge for the party’s future. Ideologically, the discourse of a Third Way reconciling economic freedom with social cohesion, fortunes for the rich and side-payments for the poor, had superior appeal in a post-Cold War period when uncontested American primacy, with the disappearance of the Evil Empire, made national self-assertion less pressing an issue in popular sensibility. By every standard measure, another Democratic success should have followed.

Clinton’s fellations in the White House, however, cost the party the election of 2000. The contingency of a sexual bavure let the Republicans back in by an infinitesimal margin. Yet it so happened that a victory won by such a chance crystallized a value-division of increasing intensity. Since the sixties, a more or less bohemian counter-culture had developed in the us, rejecting conventional mores and beliefs. Radicalized by opposition to the war in Vietnam, it had served as a convenient target for Nixon to rally a silent majority of law-abiding patriots to his cause. With the fading of war in Indochina as an issue, depoliticization of this area set in. From the late seventies onwards, much of what was once a counter-culture migrated into a less rigidly regimented, vaguely bien-pensant sector of mainstream bourgeois life itself, where market forces normalized flouting of traditional taboos into profitable forms of repressive de-sublimation. [11] This mutation, of which Clinton could be taken as a tawdry emblem, catalysed a vehement reaction in the ranks of low-denomination religion, pitting no longer a ‘silent’ but a ‘moral’ majority—in reality another minority, of evangelicals—against godless subversion of right living. Self-conceived as conservative, these groups became over time shock troops of Republican electoral mobilization, propelling contrary forces—sympathy for lgbt would be a short-hand today—into the Democratic camp. Here, it is widely believed, lay one root of an increasing polarization of the political system. [12]
5

In 2000 Bush was a beneficiary of this tension. But his campaign was moderate in tone and its success was not due to any overt appeal to religious zeal: capture of independent voters, not turn-out of the already committed, gave him the White House. By 2004, this had changed: his three-million-vote victory came in good part from all-out mobilization by the evangelical base the Republican Party could now rely on. But between the base of the party and its high command there remained a significant distance. Belying its reputation as a regime of the radical right, the Bush Presidency was in general domestically pragmatic, not reversing but adapting to the inflexion of neo-liberal accumulation—and legitimation—bequeathed by Clinton. Confronted with the same economic difficulties as his two predecessors—at inauguration, a business-cycle recession; throughout, the intractable pressures of the long downturn—Bush presided over a combination of the fiscal giveaways and military Keynesianism of the first with the asset-price Keynesianism of the second: public deficits triple the size of Reagan’s, and a mortgage spree on top of Clinton’s, taking housing debt to $11 trillion at a time when the gdp of the country was around $14 trillion. Three tax-cuts exceeded Reagan’s record in size, if not quite in the extent—pronounced enough—of their tilt towards wealth. Bankruptcy laws were tightened to favour creditors. An aggressive bid to privatize parts of Social Security, an idea already floated by Clinton, came to nothing. With bipartisan support, civil liberties were cut back and defence expenditures doubled.

But like that of the Democratic Administration before it, at home the neo-liberalism of the Republican regime was compensatory in design, requiring its ideological supplement. Sub-prime mortgages, manna for packagers and bankers presented as help to the disadvantaged, were a typical inheritance from Clinton. But however large these would loom economically, they required a social agenda alongside them. Bush had been elected on a slogan of compassionate conservatism, and in office paid his respects to it. The No Child Left Behind Act increased federal spending on education more than any government since the War on Poverty. The Medicare Prescription Bill—in the words of a Democratic observer, ‘a massive expansion of the entitlement state’—was the largest extension of health care since the time of Johnson. Even immigration reform, to regularize the position of illegal entrants and tighten employer use of them, though blocked by opposition in Congress—principally but not exclusively from his own party—was attempted by Bush. In the wake of mega-scandals left by financial deregulation—Enron, WorldCom—the Sarbanes–Oxley bill instituted weak checks on corporate fraud, rather than actively enabling it as Rubin and Summers had done. The overall social record was not one of die-hard reaction.

Macro-economically, the direction was set at the Federal Reserve, where Greenspan backed the new round of tax-cuts as a stimulus to growth, lowered interest rates repeatedly to sustain equity prices, and encouraged the spread of sub-primes. But the financial bubble created in the nineties could not be extended forever. In the autumn of 2008, the reckoning came on Bush’s watch. Amid general panic at the collapse at Lehman, a meltdown of the banking system was averted only through emergency purchase by the Treasury of $400 billion of assets at risk on Wall Street. The debacle, an end-product of the Clinton era, ensured the rout of McCain a few weeks later.
6

Democratic victory at the polls, however, was more than a reflex of the crash. It corresponded to a gradual sea-change in the sociology of the electorate, under way since the nineties and long predicted to alter the balance of partisan forces in times to come. The hard-hats won by Nixon and Reagan had shrunk: between 1980 and 2010, the proportion of whites without college education dropped from 70 to 40 per cent. The size of the non-white electorate—black, brown and yellow—had doubled since Clinton had won it in 1992, from 13 to 26 per cent. Since then, no Republican has won a majority of its fastest-growing segment, Hispanics. Most important of all, women had started voting in greater numbers than men in the eighties, and from the nineties onwards, not only has a large majority invariably voted Democratic, but their turn-out has increased disproportionately. In 2008, some ten million more women cast a ballot than men. To these demographic dividends were added the gradually cumulative effects of cultural deregulation, as marriage rates tumbled and professions of faith declined. In the fifties, over 90 per cent of American voters under thirty were married; today, less than 30 per cent. Married couples now form only 45 per cent of households, those with children just 20 per cent. More than a quarter of the population no longer describes itself as Christian. [13]

Such corset-loosening—compatible, of course, with any amount of market-friendly conformism—has gone furthest in the two groups historically most affected by the domestication of the counter-culture, youth and wealthy professionals, each now a key Democratic vote-bank. Crucially, it has also wrenched apart the Sunbelt: California, the most populous state in the nation, becoming overwhelmingly Democratic in the mid-nineties, just as the South became overwhelmingly Republican. The net effect of these changes has been to replace what was once something like class politics with what is now closer to identity politics, as the basis of coalition-formation and electoral mobilization. In the process, traditional income determinations have been losing their salience, or warping into their opposite. [14] Emblematically, in 2008 a majority of white voters living on less than $50,000 a year voted for McCain, a majority earning over $200,000 a year for Obama. Four years later, eight out of the ten richest counties in the country voted for Obama. In every one of these cradles of plutocracy, his margin of victory was greater than the national average. [15]

Financial crisis, demographic change, socio-cultural permutation: at the dusk of the Bush Presidency, all favoured the Democrats. To these the candidate added his own symbolic charge. Obama won the nomination in 2008 because the Democratic Party—for which, like the Republican, first-past-the-post rules, inherited from a pre-modern English oligarchy, form an untouchable system of political closure in the public arena—had for the first time mandated proportional representation in all of its primaries. Had traditional winner-takes-all rules applied, Clinton’s wife, scooping the pool in seven out of ten of the largest state delegations, [16] would have won the nomination with ease. In the event, the rule-change produced the perfect candidate for the hour: not only younger, cooler and more eloquent, but magnetic for the minorities on which victory depended. Image, which in a politics of the spectacle always matters more than reality, normally requires projection. But here, in the perception of colour, it was literal, allowing edifying legend (an autobiography under contract before even graduation) to develop around reality with unusual speed and ease.

Personification of national triumph over race prejudice, vindication of the American dream of success possible for all, devout yet moderate reconciler of divisions, bearer of hope to the disregarded and afflicted, Obama could serve as a hold for any number of uplifting popular identifications. Remote from any ghetto, his actual background and trajectory—like McCain, product of one of the overseas outposts of turn-of-the-century us imperialism (Panama, Hawaii); tutelary grandmother, first female vice-president of a bank in the country; educated at one of America’s top private schools (Punahou is worth around $1 billion); passage through Columbia and Harvard—could only be irrelevant to these. Once invested with the authority of office, looks and aplomb have generated a celebrity ruler—colour relaying style to yield a jfk for a multi-cultural age, attracting much the same kind of engouement in the local intelligentsia and its counterparts abroad. In the electorate at large, colour remains more divisive, but its equations have altered. There, in the net partisan balance, a racism that is still widespread, if now largely unspoken, has moved from being a surreptitious asset to a clear-cut liability. Among voters, the prospect of the first only half-white President attracted less hostility than a vision of the first half-black one aroused enthusiasm.

The bearing of colour, critical in delivering victory to Obama at the polls, has been minimal on his record in office. One out of five male blacks has continued to know incarceration under his rule, without a word from the White House on their fate. The indices of black unemployment and poverty have not budged. The business of the Democratic Administration has lain elsewhere. Its first concern was necessarily containment of the financial crisis: the banks had been bailed out under Bush, but in the wake of the crash the economy was in free fall. To check the drop, an emergency stimulus of $800 billion—the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act—was rushed through, of which tax cuts were once again the largest single component (37 per cent). But this time assorted expenditure on infrastructure, research, energy and social needs made up nearly half the total (45 per cent), for a package hailed by its admirers as a ‘New New Deal’. [17] Reform of health care, at which Clinton had stumbled, was the next priority. With the backing of the insurance industry and the ama, and a filibuster-proof Democratic majority in Congress, Obama could now pass an Affordable Care Act seeking to make health coverage universal, and reduce costs enough to pay for itself. To avert further financial mayhem, the Dodd–Frank Bill multiplied new agencies for the oversight of Wall Street, and duties for the existing agencies. To maintain vigilance against terrorism, the Administration extended wire-tapping without warrants under the Patriot Act. Last but not least, the military budget, running at $629 billion when Bush left office, rose yet further under Obama, to $707 billion by 2012. The public debt, $10.7 trillion in 2008, had jumped to nearly $16 trillion by the end of his first term.
7

How little the parameters of the political system had shifted with the reversion to Democratic tenure of the White House can be seen by the degree of continuity in the agendas of the Bush and Obama presidencies. Both rulers, like Reagan before them, took office in a recession and responded with tax-cuts to goose the economy. Both presided over weak measures to rein in financial excesses. Both extended health-care benefits to gain social support. Both increased federal funding on education. Both sought reform of immigration. Both hiked military spending, and curbed civil liberties. Both escalated the deficit. The principal difference has lain in the size and direction of the side-payments each partisan variant has made, within a framework set by the joint requirements of business confidence and voter appeasement, in conditions of deteriorating economic performance. Under the Republican Administration, the ideological supplement sustaining the regime became a hyperbolic nationalism, powering the strike-back against 9/11, and covering a fiscal tilt to the rich. By 2008, the length and outcome of successive overseas expeditions had exhausted this formula, clearing the space for a Democratic alternative somewhat closer to Bush’s original appeal, what in the local idiom might be called ‘compassionate liberalism’, covering an increase in public expenditure and a fiscal tilt towards the less well-off.

The political difference was sufficient to put Obama back into the White House in 2012. But it scarcely alters the boundary-markers in place since the days of Carter and Reagan. The scattered disbursements of the federal stimulus, often undercut by fiscal contraction at state level, have left most of their recipients cold. The centre-piece of Democratic reform, the Affordable Health Care Act, is a much more ambitious scheme than Bush’s Medicare Prescription bill. But it is cast in the same mould: an extension of social benefits in exchange for a bonanza to the private health-care industry—the pharmaceutical corporations, their over-priced drugs guaranteed a state-subsidized market in one case; the insurance companies, their over-charged customers expanded by state ordinance in the other. [18] In theory a universal health-care system compelling every solvent adult under 65 to take out private insurance, in practice it is mainly an extension of Medicaid, but one that will still leave about 30 million Americans uninsured, [19] and the rest bewildered in a system of yet more complexity and opacity than before—the bill enacting it is 900 pages long. In due course, sectors of the population will benefit, if not as much as those profiting from them, but it is little surprise that enthusiasm for the reform has been so tepid, suspicion so widespread.

By 2012, now all too aware of the modesty of Affordable Care’s popular appeal, and the relative invisibility of the effects of Recovery and Reinvestment, the Administration switched over to an attack on the favours lavished on the rich by the Republicans, to far greater political effect. Ideologically critical to Obama’s re-election in 2012, the practical import of this turn has been limited: a mere 5 per cent increase in the top rate of income tax on the very wealthy, in exchange for a 2 per cent increase in the payroll tax extracted from those who are not, and the locking in of Bush’s tax-cuts for all those earning less than $400,000 a year as permanent reductions. Surveying the record, a staunch supporter of Obama was moved to complain that a president ‘whose platform consists of Mitt Romney’s health-care bill, Newt Gingrich’s environmental policies, John McCain’s deficit-financed payroll tax cuts, George W. Bush’s bailouts of failing banks and corporations, and a mixture of the Bush and Clinton tax rate’ was being caricatured by Republicans as a threat to capitalism. [20] Attempts by enthusiasts to talk up the Administration’s achievement as a second New Deal miss the comparator. Its egalitarian sheen belongs with the callisthenic gauze of the New Frontier.
8

Obama’s stimulus helped to prevent the American economy from going into a nose-dive in 2010: according to conventional estimates, it saved about 3 million jobs and 6 per cent of gdp, a bit less than the combined impact of tarp and monetary loosening by the Federal Reserve. [21] Growth remained anaemic—just over 2 per cent across Obama’s first term—and unemployment high: officially calculated at around 12 million, or 8 per cent of the workforce. [22] But given that the financial crash of 2008 was a bigger shock than that suffered by any other major capitalist country, the short-term response to it was effective. With less at risk, the leading European states did worse: over the same period of crisis, growth in Germany averaged 0.7 per cent, France 0.075 and Britain minus 0.2, Italy minus 1.45. Performance has followed policy: fiscal austerity to balance budgets in Europe, fiscal abundance to check recession in America. The key to Obama’s political survival, however, was the privilege of us seignorage: the ability of the American state, and it alone, to run what deficit it pleases without much risk of fluttering foreign bond-holders. Even as its trade gap steadily widens, and its public debt rises, the United States remains the central fortress of the world capitalist economy, and in times of general uncertainty the safest haven for property-owners everywhere. Stop-gap as the measures of the Democratic Administration may have been, the hole into which the American economy risked falling was avoided.

The long-term trends of the economy are another matter. Campaigning for re-election, Obama decried the gulf between the super-rich and the ‘middle class’—the local euphemism for the rest of the population, American society by definition containing no lower classes—promising to set matters right with juster taxes. Rhetoric and reality have had little connexion. Under Obama, inequality has continued to grow. A year after tarp, when one out of every six Americans was jobless, and labour unions lost a tenth of their membership, the famous 1 per cent at the top of the income pyramid took 93 per cent of all gains, and Wall Street ladled out the second highest pool of executive bonuses on record—$140 billion. By 2011, while 45 million Americans were on food stamps and median wages fell 2.7 per cent, corporate profits were up 50 per cent since the crash and the Gini index recorded its biggest one-year jump since 2003. [23]Big capital has done well out of the Great Recession, the bigger the better. By the close of Obama’s first term, the ten largest banks controlled nearly 50 per cent of all assets and the top two—BoA, jp Morgan—each held over $2 trillion.

So far there has been little popular protest. The one attempt to arouse it, the Occupy movement, failed to ignite any mass response. Even when its slogans were—all too easily—rendered down into Presidential boiler-plate, they still had only a limited take-up. A campaign highlighting the arrogance and egoism of the rich, personified by his billionaire opponent, kept Obama in office. But it galvanized no popular upsurge. Fewer bothered to vote than in 2008; the incumbent lost some four million supporters; his adversary gained half a million. Like his predecessors, the President returned to the White House with the assent of roughly a quarter of the adult population. The predominant mood continues to be not indignation, or enthusiasm; it remains a depoliticized quietism.
9

Just this underlying environment of mass apathy is what lends active minorities a power in the political system beyond their numbers. The polarization of outlooks that is now regularly held to be its greatest bane is their affair. In the vacuum created by the many—an unorganized, passive citizenry dispersed across a vast continent—the passions of the few, those with the will and means to mobilize, take on a peculiar intensity, little affected by the surrounding numbness. But as generally noted, the polarization has been asymmetrical. On the Democratic side, zeal has remained roughly where it has been since the end of the New Deal era: a centrism now animated by far greater detestation for its opponent than before, but otherwise little radicalized in substantive positions, save on cultural issues. On the Republican side, by contrast, radicalization has been marked, in a shift to the right that has attracted a large literature. [24] What accounts for the asymmetry? 

It is not new. The structure of the all-capitalist ideological universe—a mental firmament in which the sanctity of private property and superiority of private enterprise are truths taken for granted by all forces in the political arena—is such that, at any given point of time, there will tend to be more elasticity to the right of its centre of gravity than to the left, since the basic belief system lends itself to stronger articulation, and readier appeal, in unalloyed rather than dilute form. This did not hold in the emergencies of depression and war during the thirties and early forties, when the role of the state in sustaining the market and defending the nation was too plain to be generally denied. But as soon as peace returned, a reaction set in, of which Taft–Hartley laid down the first marker.

Since then four features have, over time, come to set the political culture of Republican foot-soldiers apart from those of any conservative party in Europe. The first and most fundamental is a degree of hostility to the state, rooted in frontier traditions and empowered by the American creed, all but unknown elsewhere. The second has been the development of a type of nationalism peculiar to the United States as the capitalist super-power in the struggle with communism, inherently more hyperbolic than that of any other Western society. The third has lain in the party’s capture of the South, the fastness of a New World racism, originating in a colonial slave society without equivalent in the Old, which has become an undeclared holding in the affective portfolio of the party. The fourth comprises new brands in the long-standing market for religious bigotry, attaching themselves to the Republican cause as secularization started to lap Democratic constituencies. These were not simultaneous but successive accretions in the palimpsest of the Republican base. Two of the four—race and religion—were late transfers from the Democratic bloc, where the Bible Belt and Jim Crow were originally at home; civil rights had been pushed through Congress by the troops of McCulloch and Dirksen, and Nixon’s plumbers would not have given a pastor the time of day. Even a third, expansionist nationalism, was only an intermittent passion: the stalwarts of Taft’s generation were isolationist, not imperialist. But in due course, the Cold War brought empire, Johnson delivered race, Falwell inducted God into the party. 

This was a cocktail to intoxicate the Republican base. The high command, since Reconstruction solidly anchored in big business, remained more sober. In a pattern that started in the fifties, outbreaks of extravagance from below would be checked by realists from above, one wave or eddy after another breaking against raison de parti in electoral competition. McCarthy was finished off by the Watkins Committee. The Birch Society was put out of court by Buckley. Goldwater was crushed at the polls. Even Reagan, for the purists, in the end disappointed. Gingrich deflated. Robertson imploded. The latest such squall, the Tea Party, is unlikely to be more lasting. [25] Even in a year when commentators all but unanimously pronounced the Republican Party in the grip of a collective dementia of extremism never witnessed before, no firebrand came near to winning its presidential nomination, which ended in an easy victory for the most conventional establishment candidate on offer. Its Congressional delegation—in the words of one authority, ‘light years’ to the right of the party in 2000–04 [26]—re-elected nem con as Speaker the epitome of a low-wattage Mid-Western pol of the old school.

This is not to say that little has changed since the nineties. The greater weight of the South within the Republican bloc, and loss of the coastal West, has hardened and narrowed American conservatism. The cards of race and religion have become a losing suit; empire has passed to the hand of its opponent. As an appeal, anti-statism remains—the Tea Party itself marking a shift from moral to fiscal fanaticism. [27] In the United States, where there are more owners of small businesses than trade-unionists, a social basis for that exists in the stratum of minor employers who populate the Tea Party and make up 40 per cent of the new Republican cohort in the House. But taxes have lost their buoyancy as an issue, now functioning more as a shibboleth of defence than attack. Dispirited by the defeat of 2012, but insufficiently shaken by a national outcome statistically still quite tight, the party has plainly lost its bearings. But careers are likely to matter more than convictions as electoral realities unfold. Opportunism is no monopoly of Democrats. In the past, timely conversions have made of many a former Republican moderate an intransigent conservative. [28] Corrections in the opposite direction can be expected among the ultras of today.
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Meanwhile, the Democrats have the upper hand. Demographic projections favour them, as millennials and Hispanics loom ever larger in the electorate, and whites decline. [29] Ideological advantage has shifted in their direction too, and is set to increase, as race and faith become handicaps rather than assets in the construction of an electoral majority, and the country no longer looks so endangered abroad. After the adventitious victory of 2000, the War on Terror offered the supplement of a hyperbolic nationalism for the Republican consolidation of power in 2004. But with the winding down of the battle against terrorism, as previously against communism, the administration of empire ceases to require the atmospherics of national emergency. Just as in the nineties the strategic baton could pass without incident to Clinton, for a social readjustment of the formula for neo-liberal rule, so today Obama can give it a cultural turn without fear of being outbid in an imperial security auction, leaving the Republican version reduced to the inferior draw of bare tax phobia.

Amplifying the gap between these appeals is the Democratic grip on the mainstream media. To all intents and purposes, the Republican megaphones on talk radio and television now speak only to the converted. Opinion formation where it matters, among the well-off and well-educated, and the independent segment of the electorate, is the territory of the dominant print media. There, the one-party regimes of red-state lore have a blue counterpart. In the capital, just under 90 per cent of bureau-chiefs voted for Clinton in 1996. [30] University departments are only a little less monolithic, close to 80 per cent voting for Kerry in 2004. [31] In 2012, the leading newspapers in every key city outside the South—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Denver, Boston, Washington—endorsed Obama. With a President at long last attuned to their sensibilities, press and academy have a spring in their step.

Demography and ideology are not the only terrain on which the balance of forces has changed. In the mid-seventies, before the onset of the new regime of accumulation, the campaign costs of a successful challenge to an incumbent in Congress averaged around $100,000. By 2002, they were $1.5 million. Total expenditure on presidential contests rose more gradually, from a plateau of some $300 million across the eighties and nineties, to $400 million in 2000, before jumping to $850 million in 2004, when Bush and Kerry raised over $400 million apiece. Four years later, Obama threw off any restraints of public funding to pile up a war-chest of over $800 million, crushing McCain in the largest financial landslide in American history: a margin of 68 to 32 per cent, far exceeding his majority at the polls, and leading the way to new heights for the politics of money. Once in office, the President wasted no time setting a further record in the quest for cash. Within five months of his inauguration, Obama was already on the trail calling for donations. By mid 2011, with elections over a year away, he had attended more fund-raisers than Carter, Reagan, the first Bush and Clinton combined, and was on course to overtake all five of his immediate predecessors put together—the second Bush included—in their re-election bids. [32] In the 2012 campaign, Obama doubled his takings again, this time matched by Romney, the two candidates between them raising $3.2 billion in their own name, and with respective front organizations, a grand total of $7 billion. [33]

In this deluge of money, the Democrats now have the edge. In 2004, the Democratic National Committee already raised more than the Republican. To traditional spigots—the entertainment industry, trial lawyers, labour unions, Silicon Valley—the party has added not only a cash-flow unmatched by its opponents from loyalists on the web, but a veritable downpour of funds from the health-care, real-estate and banking industries. Ties to the financial sector formed in the nineties have only strengthened over the intervening years. In 2007–08, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee raked in four times as much money from Wall Street as its Republican counterpart. [34] The shift in corporate allegiance is in part simple recognition of which party is in the ascendant, and in a position to return the most favours. But it also reflects rational calculations of which is a better stabilizer of capitalism in a period of turbulence, when the economy needs further pump-priming and society a rhetoric of diversity and inclusion. [35] On its side, the Democratic Party is using its new-found wealth to build a nationwide party machine more powerful than anything so far in prospect across the aisle, converting Obama’s campaign hoard into a ‘non-profit’ organization to keep its supporters at action stations for the duration. Its planners look forward with confidence to an era of continuous political dominance.
11

In themselves, Obama’s two victories fall short of a turning-point in the political system. Neither their scale nor their setting compare with those of Roosevelt or Reagan as historical landmarks. fdr took 42 states with 57.4 per cent of the vote in 1932, 46 states with 60.8 per cent in 1936; Reagan 44 states with 50.8 of the vote in 1980 (but with a third party candidate, a nearly 10-point lead over his Democratic opponent), and 49 states with 58.8 per cent in 1984. By contrast, Obama won 28 states with 52.9 per cent of the vote in 2008, and 26 states with 51.1 per cent in 2012. His margins of victory were not only smaller, but declined after his first term, where theirs increased. That does not preclude subsequent dynastic consolidation under Clinton ii: the scansions of change within the system can alter. The more important difference lies in the structural context of the Obama Presidency. Roosevelt and Reagan took office when the previous regime of accumulation had exhausted itself, and the lineaments of a new one were to hand. In the thirties, there was no shortage of ideas in the Brains Trust or outside it—the Stockholm School, Keynes, Schacht—for how to overcome the Depression, even if it took time for the New Deal to make some use of them. In the eighties, a neo-liberal counter-attack—the Austrians, the Chicago School, Lucas—had long been in preparation, with an arsenal of prescriptions for dealing with stagflation to hand. Today, the regime of accumulation in place has fallen into disarray. But, objectively, it is not yet in acute crisis; and subjectively, the landscape is barren of ideas that might adumbrate a new one. It is this underlying impasse which has produced a political scene at once closely and deeply divided. [36]

In America, immediate difficulties have been met with lame-Keynesian remedies: excess of public expenditure over revenue, quantitative expansion; in Europe, lacking the imperial prerogative of printing money, with semi-Austrian recipes. Neither offers an answer to the prolonged slow-down of the advanced capitalist economies that set in forty years ago, and the fuite en avant into ever new forms of debt creation to avert the danger of a traumatic shake-out. [37] This is a regime of accumulation that has enormously enriched a few, but failed to restore dynamism to the Atlantic world or its Japanese extension, and left the system more precarious than when it came into being. In its hour of political triumph, the Obama Administration faces economic pressures that offer little opportunity for either the social reforms of Roosevelt or the fiscal donatives of Reagan: threatening deficits, escalating entitlements, sputtering growth. Cultural surrogates offer a temporary way out: changes that cost little or nothing—legalization of undocumented immigrants, gun control, marriage for all. Beyond them, the leeway looks small.

Since the emergence of a new regime of accumulation in the eighties, the Atlantic political systems have known two kinds of dominance: an organic formula for neo-liberal rule and a clear-cut electoral sweep. These may coincide or diverge. The most coherent and effective expression of an ideology, and decisive victory at the polls, are not always the same thing. In Britain, which pioneered the turn, Thatcher achieved a comprehensive hegemony without ever winning a majority of the electorate, the Conservatives of the period never getting more than 44 per cent of the vote. In the United States, where the terrain was more favourable, Reagan combined an organic formula for the turn with large majorities. In the nineties, the Third Way regimes of Clinton and Blair offered variants on the legacy of their predecessors, functioning at once to deepen its grip and anaesthetize its impact. Fair-weather formations, the first was cut short before it could be undone by the retribution eventually visited on the second for the economic costs of their tenure. Theirs was a ‘weightless hegemony’. [38] Today, electoral victories much like those they achieved are commonplace in Europe, with still less staying-power behind them, as so many reflex reactions to crisis without conviction of exit from it. In the us, the regalian rights of the dollar have mitigated the effects of the crash. But the system-wide deadlock in the regime of accumulation persists, politically over-determined by the local Kulturkampf of colours and mores. The upshot is the unbalanced balance of partisan forces at which commentators wring their hands today. The neo-liberal order has become a political no-man’s land, in which no organic formula of rule is now in sight.



 [1] Regime of accumulation: term derived originally from the Marxist work of Michel Aglietta, Régulation et crises du capitalisme, Paris 1976, of which an institutionalist equivalent can be found in Douglas Forsyth and Ton Notermans, ‘Macroeconomic Policy Regimes and Financial Regulation in Europe, 1931–1994’, in Forsyth and Notermans, eds, Regime Changes, Providence, ri 1997, pp. 17–68. 

 [2] Semantically, a symptom of this closed universe is the transformation in local vocabulary of the term ‘liberal’ into a merely social or cultural outlook, denuded of reference to the economic principles that have historically defined it elsewhere, since in the us the axioms of the free market are common to all. Thus ‘neo-liberal’, universal currency abroad, is a lexical embarrassment for those who identify themselves with the indigenous version.

 [3] First came the off-ramp from gold, passage of Glass–Steagall and nira, in 1933; then the Wagner and Social Security Acts, in 1935. 

 [4] For this history, see Robert Brenner, ‘Structure vs Conjuncture’, nlr 43, January–February 2007, pp. 37–40, the most important single text for understanding the evolution of us politics since the New Deal.

 [5] See Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, New York and London 2006, passim, the fundamental history of post-war capitalism. 

 [6] The origins of the aei go back to 1943, when corporate executives flocked to Washington for roles in the war economy, but its transformation into a conservative powerhouse dates from the seventies: by 1980 it had over 600 corporate sponsors. The Heritage Foundation was set up in 1973, the Cato Institute in 1977. For these developments, see Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, New York 2010, pp. 118–20. 

 [7] For the notion of ideological supplement, see ‘Testing Formula Two’, nlr 8, March–April 2001, pp. 7–8. 

 [8] At presidential level, Goldwater took six Southern states in 1964; Nixon eight in 1968, and the whole region in 1972. Reagan won all but Georgia in 1980, and swept the board in 1984. But at Congressional level, the Republican breakthrough did not come until 1994.

 [9] Celebrating the abolition of Glass–Steagall, Treasury Secretary Summers announced: ‘Today Congress voted to update the rules that have governed financial services since the Great Depression and replace them with a system for the 21st century. This historic legislation will better enable American companies to compete in the new economy.’ Sandy Weill, head of Citigroup, which had just hired Summers’s predecessor Rubin as its chairman, and would be fined $2.65 billion—the largest such penalty in the history of Wall Street—for its criminality in the WorldCom scandal, would proudly display among his trophies the pen Clinton used to sign the repeal of Glass–Steagall: Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed, New York 2011, p. 349. Weill’s point-man with Clinton’s White House, helping him assure passage of the bill, was Gene Sperling, later a stipendiary of Goldman Sachs, now Chairman of Obama’s National Economic Council.

 [10] ‘This huge supply shock radically changed the relative returns on capital and labour. It made inflation global, meaning that its rates have become highly correlated all over the world, and it subdued long-run inflation. Subsequently risk aversion abated, and in most emerging-market countries the cost of credit has fallen, while the rate of profit has risen. No wonder that credit surged and financed a boom in asset prices’: Michel Aglietta, ‘Into a New Growth Regime’, nlr 54, November–December 2008, p. 72.

 [11] A process foreseen by Marcuse already in the mid-fifties, coining the term in Eros and Civilization.

 [12] For dismissal of the idea that significant value-conflicts divide the electorate at large, as distinct from minorities on either side, see Morris Fiorina (with Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope), Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, New York 2005, pp. 15–25 et seq, and (with Samuel Abrams) Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics, Norman, ok 2009; supported by Andrew Gelman, ‘Economic Divisions and Political Polarization in Red and Blue America’, Pathways, Summer 2011, pp. 3–6, for whom value-conflicts are confined to the upper-middle class and the rich, leaving the rest of the population cold. That polarization is, on the contrary, rooted in conspicuous divisions of popular sentiment and conviction is a leading theme in the work of Alan Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization and American Democracy, New Haven 2011, and The Polarized Public?, Upper Saddle Valley, nj 2013. There is little doubt that Abramowitz has the better of the argument, for which the hardening division of states into ‘blue’ and red’ columns is the plainest evidence.

 [13] For these figures, see Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, p. 129; Economist, 25 June 2011.

 [14] The most extended case for the belief that there is a continuing, clear-cut economic division between Democratic and Republican electorates, the less well-off opting for the former, the better-off for the latter, is developed in Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America, Cambridge, ma 2008, which argues that the ‘income effect’ trumps all other determinants of voting behaviour. Appearing before Obama’s two electoral victories, their findings risk looking dated in the light of them. In 2012 Obama ‘carried only one-third of non-college [sc. working-class] white men, the worst performance since Walter Mondale was buried in Ronald Reagan’s 1984 landslide’: Ronald Brownstein, ‘Why Obama Is Giving Up On Right-Leaning Whites’, The National Journal, 31 January 2013.

 [15] Paul Toscano, ‘Obama Wins 8 out of 10 Wealthiest Counties in us’, cnbc, 7 November 2012, based on Census Bureau data of average household income 2006–11.

 [16] California, Texas, New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan. The provincialism of American political science, and debate in general, is such that this condition of Obama’s success has merited scarcely a line of comment, let alone of reflection.

 [17] The most euphoric billboard for the Administration has been erected by Michael Grunwald, The New New Deal, New York 2012, where the stimulus becomes ‘more than 50 per cent bigger than the entire New Deal, twice as big as the Louisiana Purchase and Marshall Plan combined’, ‘the biggest and most transformative energy bill in us history’, ‘the biggest and most transformative education reform bill since the Great Society’, ‘the biggest foray into industrial policy since fdr’, ‘the biggest middle-class tax cut since Ronald Reagan’, ‘the biggest infusion of research money ever’, etc—all this from an author capable of writing ‘nothing in life except parenthood lives up to the hype’ (sic): pp. 10–11, 448.

 [18] In the gratified words of the leading encomium of the Act, complete with White House photo-ops on the cover, ‘As for businesses in the us economy’s vast health-care sector, they are going to win, on balance, enjoying more customers and opportunities for growth and profits . . . Traders in health-industry stocks know how to penetrate the partisan and ideological fog to see the economic bottom line’: Lawrence Jacobs and Theda Skocpol, Health Care Reform and American Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York 2010, p. 135: on the day the Act was passed, Wall Street hit an eighteen-month high. The principal architect of the law, Elizabeth Fowler—working under the top senatorial recipient of cash from the health-care industry, Max Baucus—was former Vice-President for Public Policy of WellPoint, America’s largest insurance company. Obama then appointed her to implement the Act. Two years later, she returned to her natural habitat as a top executive of the pharmaceutical giant Johnson & Johnson. For a trenchant summary of the political and social nub of the Act, see Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking, New York 2012, pp. 228–31; for a deeper and yet more devastating critique, see Roger Hodge, The Mendacity of Hope, New York 2010, pp. 129–49.

 [19] For the numbers who will continue to be uninsured, see the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office, cited in ‘Court’s Ruling May Blunt Reach of the Health Law’, New York Times, 24 July 2012.

 [20] Ezra Klein, ‘Block Obama!’, New York Review of Books, 27 September 2012.

 [21] Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi, ‘How the Great Recession Was Brought to an End’, 27 July 2010, p. 7; available on Moody’s Analytics site.

 [22] The true figure, including drop-outs from the labour force who no longer even seek a job, is probably over 14 million: see Mort Zuckerman, ‘How We Can End Our Modern-Day Depression’, us News and World Report, 1 February 2013. Between 2000 and 2011, the economic participation rate dropped from 64 to 58 per cent of the population: Luce, Time to Start Thinking, p. 92.

 [23] Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed, p. 397; Daniel Gross, Better, Stronger, Faster, New York 2012, p. 52; Timothy Noah, ‘The Equality Inaugural’, The New Republic, 21 January 2013. Median income fell by more during the ‘recovery’ of 2009–11 than during the ‘recession’ of 2007–09: Luce, Time to Start Thinking, p. 272. 

 [24] Typically accompanied by wistful hopes for a return to earlier American moderation, often after arguments that increasing social inequality has been a key determinant of political polarization. Thus Hacker and Pierson—after documenting at length the corruption of the political system and its consequences, and then deciding that even if it only ‘nibbles at the edges’ of these, Obama’s record has after all been ‘genuinely impressive’—conclude that nevertheless ‘the guardians of moderation need help’, if ‘a vibrant, dynamic capitalism’ is to prevail: Winner-Take-All Politics, pp. 301–2, 304; while McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, after producing striking correlations between rising inequality and increasing polarization, express the wish that ‘the Sam Rayburns, John Heinzes, Dan Rostenkowskis, Sam Nunns and so on, would return and bring some sense back into our politics. As citizens, we hope moderation returns before serious cracks in our institutions occur’: Polarized America, p. 203. Rostenkowski was, of course, jailed for corruption, and then pardoned, along with runaway financier Marc Rich and others, by Clinton on his memorable last day in office. Among the authors is a one-time occupant of the Kenneth Lay Chair of Political Science at the University of Houston.

 [25] For the continuities in the politics of the popular Right in the us, see the essays written between the mid-fifties and mid-sixties by Richard Hofstadter. ‘The modern right wing, as Daniel Bell has put it, feels dispossessed: America has been largely taken away from them and their kind, though they are determined to repossess it.’ Noting that ‘the entire right-wing movement’ was not only dotted with fundamentalist preachers, but ‘infused at mass level with the fundamentalist style of mind’, Hofstadter reminded his readers of how passionately the small-town and rural Protestants of the 1920s had defended cultural values that were resurfacing in the Goldwater period, when—plus ça change—‘the largest single difficulty facing the right wing as a force within the Republican party is its inability to rear and sustain national leaders’. The Tea Party is less outré than many of its forebears, for whom Eisenhower’s nomination meant ‘eight more years of socialism’, and Dulles was a ‘Communist agent’: The Paranoid Style in American Politics [re-edition], Cambridge, ma 1996, pp. 23, 73, 78–9, 45, 28.

 [26] Theda Skocpol, Obama and America’s Political Future, Cambridge, ma 2012, p. 47.

 [27] Survey data report that ‘nearly half of Tea Party supporters say they have not heard of the religious right or have no strong opinion about it—and about one in ten Tea Partiers express strong disagreement with religious conservatism’: Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, New York 2012, p. 36.

 [28] Cheney was once a critic of any crackdown on campus protests, calling for ‘greater understanding and moderation in responding to student concerns and disorders’; Rumsfeld, a young moderate in revolt against his moss-back elders; Gingrich, a follower of Nelson Rockefeller; Mitch McConnell, a scorner of the Nixon Administration as ‘at worst completely reactionary and at best totally indecisive’: Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, New York 2012, pp. 267, 132, 242, 320.

 [29] For a coruscating analysis of these trends, and the concomitant tensions within the Republican bloc, see Mike Davis, ‘The Last White Election’, nlr 79, January–February 2013, pp. 5–52, which also offers the most telling account of the consolidation of Republican power at state level in its bastions of the South and Midwest, and their importance in the ‘odd and complex orrery’ of the us political system at large, where at federal level the Supreme Court circles in another generally conservative orbit: pp. 12, 46–7 ff.

 [30] Thomas Edsall, Building Red America, New York 2006, p. 101.

 [31] Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, ‘The Social and Political Views of American Professors’, Working Paper, September 2007, p. 36. 

 [32] Brendan Doherty, The Rise of the President’s Permanent Campaign, Lawrence, ks 2012, pp. 82–3, 149, 167.

 [33] Federal Election Commission, 31 January 2013.

 [34] From 1999 to 2006, the top five Senatorial recipients of cash from securities and investment firms were all Democrats—in rank order: Schumer, Kerry, Lieberman, Clinton and Dodd: Winner-Take-All Politics, pp. 226–7. In 2002, when the top recipient in the House was Rahm Emmanuel, two-thirds of the roll-call of largest campaign donors poured their money into the party of the common man, as Truman liked to call it: ‘perhaps surprisingly’ is the artless comment of McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal in Polarized America, p. 140—within their framework, it would be more accurate to say, incomprehensibly.

 [35] In Hodge’s crisp formulation, ‘Politics, we might say, is the continuation of business by other means’: Mendacity of Hope, p. 8. In 2008 Goldman Sachs alone lavished three-quarters of its funding on the Democrats, with Citigroup not far behind: p. 46.Perr

 [36] For the novelty of this configuration, see Ronald Brownstein’s commanding study The Second Civil War, New York 2007, pp. 17–19 ff, passim. He points out that Republicans were easily dominant up to the Depression, Democrats during the high tide of the New Deal. Then, from the late thirties to the mid-sixties, the political system was closely but not deeply divided, Democrats and Republicans routinely crossing party lines in an era of bipartisan negotiation. Since then, it has become both deeply and closely divided. The observation is acute, but its periodization is weakened by a tendency to elide partisan policies and electoral preferences, leading Brownstein to date the beginnings of the third era from Reagan’s Presidency, on the grounds that it detonated ideological passions that intensified conflict between the parties. The country, however, was not closely divided under Reagan, who commanded huge majorities in the Electoral College throughout. It is only under the last three Presidencies that deep but close division set in. The unfamiliarity of this development, underlined by Brownstein, is left largely unexplained by him. In general, it is striking how blind even the most accomplished American political science or sociology is to the economic history structuring shifts in the political system. For the latest example, see the exchanges between Theda Skocpol, Larry Bartels, Mickey Edwards and Suzanne Mettler in Obama and America’s Political Future, all of which proceed as if their subject could be discussed without so much as a glance at the fortunes of American capitalism.

 [37] The most powerful analysis of the political logic at work in successive phases of this process is provided by Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Crises of Democratic Capitalism’, nlr 71, September–October 2011, pp. 5–29.

 [38] Susan Watkins, ‘A Weightless Hegemony: New Labour’s Role in the Neo-Liberal Order’, nlr 25, January–February 2004, pp. 5–23.